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I. INTRODUCTION
There is currently raging, among the various jurisdictions, an intense
dispute over the nature and definition of the term "security." In some
jurisdictions, judicial interpreters of local "Blue Sky" statutes have toed
the line of traditional concepts. In others, the judiciary, spurred on by
cries of public policy, has seized upon new concepts with the result that
many of the local securities acts now are held to embrace transactions
* Member of the Florida Bar and of the Firm of Tew, Tew & Murray, Miami, Florida.
** Member of the Editorial Board and Associate Editor, University of Miami Law
Review.
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that were once thought clearly to be outside the scope of the statutes.
But there are two groups in society whose needs also warrant the protec-
tion of "public policy" who are placed in grave jeopardy by the judicial
abandonment of traditional concepts of the term "security": business-
men, who find that the road to jail is paved with wrong guesses by
corporate counsel; and corporate counsel, who find that the road to
malpractice is paved with definitions of the term "security" that defy
any possibility of logical business planning.1 In short, from the viewpoint
of these two groups, new definitions have transformed the securities acts
from firm but comprehendible policemen into ravenous monsters. The
thrust of this article will be to critically dissect the traditional definition
of the term "security" and to contrast the traditional concept with the
"risk capital" concept now adopted in an expanding minority of jurisdic-
tions.
II. HOWEY-THE TRADITIONAL VIEW: ONE PARTY SUPPLIES THE WORK
AND THE OTHER SUPPLIES THE FUNDS. A "SECURITY" HAS BEEN
SOLD WHEN THE VALUE OF ONE'S PURCHASE DEPENDS ON
THE ABILITIES OF SOMEONE ELSE
The following analysis of the economic relationships inherent in
the purchase and sale of securities is based upon two underlying assump-
tions:
1. While all securities may be investments, not all investments
are securities.
As one federal court has put it: "To conclude that the natural desire
of any purchaser that his purchase should appreciate in value make a
'security' of what has been purchased, is obviously to so muddle the term
as to make it meaningless."2 Thus, it is crucial to isolate the criteria that
separate an investment from a "security." That task is one of the under-
takings of this article.
2. All subclasses of instruments or arrangements within the
generic term "security" are founded upon the same economic
relationship between the issuer and the purchaser.
The typical securities act will contain, in addition to the more easily
recognizable securities such as stock or debentures, a collection of seem-
ingly innocuous terms such as "investment contract" or "certificate of
interest or participation in a profit sharing scheme." The critical economic
arrangements in all of these terms are basically identical. Certainly there
are the fundamental differences between an equity interest and a debt
1. Additionally, corporate counsel may find the road to jail, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 2(a) (1970).
2. Contract Buyers League v. F & F Inv., 300 F. Supp. 210, 224 (N.D. Il1. 1969).
3. "[A] corporate share is a very complicated chose in action. It is not a right to a
definite sum of money, but rather to a proportionate share of the assets of the company,
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interest.4 But "the term 'securities' is a more inclusive term than 'invest-
ment contracts.' "5 If an interest has "so many of the substantial at-
tributes of 'stock,' 'share,' 'evidence of indebtedness,' and 'investment
contract,' "I it must fall within the statutory scheme even though it is not
entirely "debt" or "equity."1
As will be demonstrated, as diverse as the ordinary concepts of
"debt" and "equity" might be, there are essential characteristics that
remain the same. So even though a particular case might specify a test
for an "investment contract," the principles can be readily applied to all
types of "securities." "Security" is a generic term, and its essential
characteristics are present in all of the various statutory subclasses. The
fact that a particular case refers to a particular statutory term is not a
crucial consideration.
With these basic premises in mind, the federal concept of the charac-
teristics of a security will now be dissected.
A. The Definition from SEC v. W. I. Howey Co.
Generally, the starting point of any discussion of the term "security"
is likely to involve the analysis of the United States Supreme Court
decision in SEC v. W.I. Howey Co.7 In Howey, the defendants owned
large tracts of citrus acreage in Lake County, Florida. Defendants
offered to the public both a land sales contract and a service contract,
informing potential buyers that an investment in a small citrus grove
was not economically feasible unless service arrangements were also
made. The average size of the tracts sold to the public was 1.33 acres,
and parcels as small as 0.65 of an acre were conveyed. Although the
purchaser, upon full payment, received a warranty deed to his small
tract, the service contract conveyed a leasehold interest back to defen-
dants. Defendants were given complete discretion and authority over
cultivation, harvesting, and marketing. The landowner did not even have
the right to enter upon his premises. There was no right to specific fruit.
All of the produce was pooled and the defendants, who were well estab-
lished in the citrus industry, disbursed a share of the net profits to the
landowners in accordance with output from the individual parcels.
In analyzing the offering, the Supreme Court noted that the term
"security" included not only the commonly known documents traded
on exchanges, but also
whatever they may be, upon dissolution." Hunt v. Eddy, 150 Kan. 1, 12-13, 90 P.2d 747,
754 (1939).
4. The fundamentals of a debt instrument involve "a written unconditional promise to
pay on demand or on a specified date a sum certain in money in return for an adequate
consideration in money or money's worth, and to pay a fixed rate of interest." INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 385.
5. State v. Evans, 154 Minn. 95, 101, 191 N.W. 425, 427 (1922).
6. Donovan v. Dixon, 261 Minn. 455, 467, 113 N.W.2d 432, 439 (1962).
7. 328 U.S. 293 (1946) [hereinafter referred to as Howey].
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"securities" of a more variable character, designated by such
descriptive terms as "certificate of interest or participation in
any profit-sharing agreement," "investment contract" and "in
general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a
'security.' "8
In characterizing the scheme offered by defendants as a type of
security known as an "investment contract," the Court specifically stated
the test that is the classic definition of the economic relationship between
purchaser and issuer:
[A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act
means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person
invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect
profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third
party .... 9
With this statement, the Court captured the essentials involved when
one supplies capital in return for a "piece of the action." "Thus all the
elements of a profit-seeking business venture are present here. The
investors provide the capital and share in the earnings and profits; the
promoters manage, control and operate the enterprise."' 0
Some three years prior to Howey, the Supreme Court had its first
opportunity to define the essentials of a "security" relationship. In
SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp.," the defendants acquired oil leases
from the owners of certain acreage for "practically nothing except
[promising] to drill a well. 1 2 Defendants, in order to finance the prom-
ised well-drilling, proceeded to sell assignments of their leases, with the
subdivided parcels going for as little as $5 per acre and usually encom-
passing 22 to 5 acres. Prospective purchasers were assured that defen-
dants would drill the well in a location that would test the oil-producing
possibilities of the offered assignments. As in Howey, the purchasers
resided throughout the country, often at a considerable distance from
the site. There was no indication that any of the purchasers were capable
of realizing a profit on their purchase through their own skills. Without
the drilling of the well, none of the leases had any value. When the
Court stated that "the undertaking to drill a well runs through the whole
transaction as the thread on which everybody's beads were strung,"" it
was expressing the concept later articulated more concisely in Ilowey-
that the expectation of profit was based upon the efforts of someone else.
Indeed, in Howey, when the Court enunciated the test of "an investment
in a common enterprise with the expectation of profit solely from the
8. Id. at 297.
9. Id. at 298-99.
10. Id. at 300.
11. 320 U.S. 344 (1943) [hereinafter referred to as Joiner].
12. Id. at 346.
13. Id. at 348.
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efforts of others," it further stated that "such a definition necessarily
underlies this Court's decision in SEC v. Joiner Corp ... .'
Such a definition, in fact, underlies all "securities" transactions.
Thus, the statutory term "evidence of indebtedness" has been equated
with the term "investment contract."'15 "Investment contract" has been
used interchangeably with "beneficial interest in or title to property or
profits,"' 6 as well as with "interest in a profit-sharing . . . scheme."'1
In short, a share of common stock is also an investment contract as
well as a certificate of interest in a profit-sharing scheme. Indeed, the
basics of the Howey test were first proposed by the SEC as the general
test for a "security."
Plaintiff [the SEC] has suggested as a definition of the general
term "security" the following: "The investment of money with
the expectation of profit through the efforts of other persons."
Such definition has support in state decisions and describes a
relationship which is in substance that of a security investor.'
One circuit has stated that Howey adds the test of "common enter-
prise" to the Joiner test of "results dependent on the efforts of one other
than the purchaser."'9 This analysis is not precisely appropriate. Howey
and Joiner express the same defintion; Howey merely articulates it more
precisely.2"
Howey, of course, did not originate the definition of the "security"
relationship stated therein. State courts had analyzed the economics of
the relationship on previous occasions.2' But the Howey enunciation car-
ries with it the prestige attached to a United States Supreme Court
decision, and, for the purpose of this article, the "Howey test" will be
used as a label for this definition of the parameters of the "security"
relationship:
14. 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
15. See, e.g., State v. Hodge, 204 Kan. 98, 460 P.2d 596 (1969).
16. See, e.g., Freeze v. Smith, 254 Mich. 386, 236 N.W. 810 (1931).
17. See, e.g., Kerst v. Nelson, 171 Minn. 191, 213 N.W. 904 (1927); State v. Heath,
199 N.C. 135, 153 S.E. 855 (1930). See also People v. Syde, 37 Cal. 2d 765, 767, 235 P.2d
601, 602 (1951), in which the Howey test was applied to the term "interest in a profit-
sharing agreement." Perhaps the most comprehensive of all applications of the Howey
formula appears in Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Hudson, 190 Ore. 458, 469, 226 P.2d 501,
505 (1951): "The terms 'evidence of indebtedness,' 'certificate of interest or participation
in any profit-sharing agreement,' and 'investment contract' as used in the act . . . contem-
plate the presence of the investment process, that is, 'the investment of funds . . . with a
view of receiving a profit through the efforts of others . . .'
18. SEC v. Universal Serv. Ass'n, 106 F.2d 232, 237 (7th Cir. 1939).
19. Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mtg. Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162, 168 (9th Cir. 1960)
(original emphasis).
20. The "common enterprise" in Joiner is delineated in section II, B, 2, b, 2, infra.
21. See, e.g., cases as early as Lewis v. Creasey Corp., 198 Ky. 409, 413-14, 248 S.W.
1046, 1048 (1923): "the investor will earn his profit through the efforts of others .... ";
and State v. Whiteaker, 118 Ore. 656, 660, 247 P. 1077, 1079 (1926); "with a view of re-
ceiving a profit through the efforts of others than the investor . .. .
1973]
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A "security" has been issued when the purchaser invests his
money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely
from the efforts of other persons.
B. An Analysis of the Howey Test with Explanations,
Caveats, and Examples
To evaluate both the correctness and the feasibility of the "Howey
test," it must be subjected to stress and critical analysis at every point.2"
Each element will be examined and probed to understand its necessity
in the overall definition.
1. THERE MUST BE AN "INVESTMENT OF MONEY"
The absence of this element produces two immediate results. First,
the test becomes meaningless, since all that is left is "in a common
enterprise with the expectation of profits to come solely from the efforts
of others"; and second, if nothing is invested, nothing can be lost, and
so the protection of the securities laws is not necessary.
If, however, instead of deleting this element, substitutions for it are
made, serious problems arise. A few examples will serve to bring these
difficulties to light.
a. The purchaser desires to buy a tract from the Howey Co.,
but he has no money. To pay for his purchase, he deeds his
home to the seller.
This example substitutes an "investment of a valuable considera-
tion" for an "investment of money." Certainly, this minor variation
does not alter the basic economic relationships within the plan. As one
court has stated, the construction of an "investment of money" to mean
" 'anything of value or any consideration, including any benefit to the
promisor or detriment to the promisee' ... does no more than effectuate
the intent of the Howey Court by adapting its investment contract defini-
tion to a much more sophisticated scheme, without at all changing its
meaning."'
b. The purchaser desires to purchase a tract from the Howey
Co. but he lacks sufficient funds; so, he pays half in cash and
transfers title to his car for the other half of the purchase price.
This is essentially the same as Example a, supra, except that it
consists of an "investment of money" in addition to an investment of
"other consideration." The economic plan remains unchanged.
c. The purchaser, a carpenter, desires to purchase a tract from
the Howey Co. but he has no or insufficient funds. He pays
22. Such an analysis is probably undertaken by every fast operator who seeks to avoid
the scope of Howey.
23. Murphy v. Dare to Be Great, Inc., 3 BLuE Sxy L. REP. ff 71,053, at 67,282 (D.C.
Super. Ct. 1972).
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whatever cash he has, and, additionally, does repair work on
the home of the seller.
This example reveals an investment of labor, either in place of, or
in addition to, money. The work done is in no way related to the income-
producing enterprise. Thus, this investment of labor serves merely as a
medium of exchange. The scheme remains unchanged, as this labor can
be merged with whatever money was paid, being merely another type of
consideration.
d. The purchaser desires to purchase a tract from the Howey
Co., but he has insufficient funds and is required to come down
to the orange groves and work.24
This example raises serious problems. It reveals a potential conflict
between an "investment of money" (or some other medium of exchange)
and the expectation that profits will come "solely from the efforts of
others." This conflict arises because the consideration invested-the
labor-may be directly related to the production of income. The question
of whether this labor is merely a consideration that can be merged with
money invested will be resolved by focusing on the nature of the labor
to be done. If the purchaser is merely sweeping the office floors, then
certainly that labor can be merged; the situation would then be identical
to that of a restaurant patron who pays his tab by washing dishes. But
if the activities place the purchaser at the heart of the income-generating
activities, the "merger" question cannot be resolved so easily without
endangering the entire concept of a "security." Consider, for example,
the economic relationships in a true partnership. Such a relationship
gives the participants full access to all relevant information, as well as
the right to a voice in the operation of the venture, and the protection of
full disclosures is not needed. Such an economic relationship is clearly
not a "security. ' 25 But if the efforts of one partner are "merged" with
any investment of funds he might have made, it could be concluded that
he is expecting profits "solely" from the remaining effort-exerters, his
partners. Such a merger obviously distorts the economic realities of a
partnership and serves no valid purpose.
The analysis of the sort of labor that can properly be merged is
more properly conducted by the inquiry into the "solely from the efforts
of others" element. At this point, then, the Howey test can be stated as
follows:
A "security" has been issued when the purchaser invests his
money (or other consideration that is acting merely as a medium
24. See, e.g., the various problems and results in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises,
Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 117 (1973) ; People v. Jacques, 137
Cal. App. 2d 823, 291 P.2d 124 (1st Dist. 1955) ; People v. Syde, 37 Cal. 2d 765, 235 P.2d 601
(1951); Austin v. Hallmark Oil Co., 21 Cal. 2d 718, 134 P.2d 777 (1943).
25. See, e.g., Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d 430 (10th Cir. 1973); Moulin v. Der Zaka-
rian, 191 Cal. App. 2d 184, 12 Cal. Rptr. 572 (4th Dist. 1961); Hanneman v. Gratz, 170
Minn. 38, 211 N.W. 961 (1927).
1973]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVII
of exchange) in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits
solely from the efforts of other persons.
2. THERE MUST BE A "COMMON ENTERPRISE"
a. A "common enterprise" is a result and not a cause; it occurs
whenever the investor's control over his chances
for success are diluted
The lack of a "common enterprise," as well as the absence of
expectation of profit "solely from the effort of others," is the key to
distinguishing an "investment" from an investment in "securities." All
securities might represent an investment, but all investments are not
"securities." As the court in an early Kentucky decision put it,
In one sense of the word every contract is an investment by
the parties thereto. If A. buys an automobile from B., the
former invests his money and procures the automobile, while
the latter invests his automobile and procures in lieu thereof
the purchase price. The same is true with reference to a contract
involving the exchange of commodities, and the same may be
truthfully said with reference to all sorts and kinds of contracts.
Surely... the Legislature [did not intend] to vest the Banking
Commissioner with supervision of all sorts of contracts, though
involving the idea of investment .... "
The following example illustrates the point:
X purchases Blackacre from Y. Y makes no representations
as to the chances that Blackacre will increase in value. X's pur-
chase is motivated by his own analysis of economic conditions
in the area; he thinks it is a "good buy."
This purchase is an investment, but it certainly is not a "security."27
It is true that the activities of other persons will determine the value
of the purchase; but these others are the amorphous group known as
"the market." In reality, there are two avenues to approach the "securi-
ties" issue here: either there is no "common enterprise" in which X is
participating, or the "others" who will affect X's success are so remote
that X is really relying upon his own skill in forecasting what the "others"
will eventually do.
The term "common enterprise" has been frequently used without
26. Lewis v. Creasey Corp., 198 Ky. 409, 415, 248 S.W. 1046, 1049 (1923). See also
Sinva, Inc. v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 359, 367 (S.D.N.Y.
1966): "In a sense anyone who buys or sells a horse or an automobile hopes to realize a
profitable 'investment.'"
27. See, e.g., SEC Securities Act Release No. 5347 (Jan. 10, 1973) (BNA SEC. REG. &
L. REP., No. 184, D-1 (1973)), to the effect that the offer of real estate as such, without
any collateral arrangements, does not involve the offer of a security. Some unsuccessful
plaintiffs have contended differently. See, e.g., In re McCormick's Estate, 284 Ill. App. 543,
I N.E.2d 769 (1936).
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any explanation of what the term entails. Perhaps the best attempt to
date has been that of the Ninth Circuit in Los Angeles Trust Deed &
Mortgage Exchange v. SEC,28 to the effect that there must be present a
party in addition to the purchaser; that the extra party must have some
economic interest in the subject matter of the scheme; and that the eco-
nomic welfare of the participants is inextricably woven together. 9
The presence of other interested parties in the scheme is essential,
because, as contrasted with the situation in the Example, supra, such
presence diminishes the control that any one investor might retain over
his chances for success. The existence of a "common enterprise" varies
directly with the number of participants in the scheme. If the investor
remains in control, there is no "common enterprise."' If there is no
"common enterprise," the purchaser acquires the "power to exercise
absolute dominion and control" over the purchase.31
b. Pooling-Discretionary accounts and condominiums
A pooling feature within a scheme is a sure sign of a "common
enterprise. 32 Pooling serves to diminish whatever control an investor
might have had, and, as will be demonstrated, serves to distinguish a
"security" from "an investment operated through an agent."
1. Discretionary accounts
Without doubt, a discretionary account with a broker involves an
investment of money with an expectation that profits will come solely
from the efforts of the broker. However, the courts that have dealt with
these accounts have occasionally stumbled on the "common enterprise"
element. The following examples will reveal the problems involved:
a. X places $100 with Y, his broker. Y has the discretion to
invest the money as he sees fit. Y is paid on a commission basis,
Y provides similar services for other investors, but all such con-
tracts are kept separate and distinct.
28. 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960).
29. We find a "common enterprise" in which the appellants and the purchasers of
second trust deed notes have an economic interest. We find that the economic wel-
fare of the purchasers is inextricably woven with the ability of LATD to locate
by the exercise of its independent judgment a sufficient number of discounted trust
deeds, and the ability of LATD to subsequently meet its commitments ....
Id. at 172.
30. And, as will subsequently be shown, there is also no expectation that profits will
result "solely from the efforts of others."
31. Sinva, Inc. v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 359, 366
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
32. One of the indicia of a "security" has been stated to be the "commingling of pay-
ments made, where contributions of many persons are pooled in the operation of the enter-
prise and administered as a unit by the issuer." SEC v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34, 39
(N.D. Cal. 1939).
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b. X places $50 with Y, his broker; Y adds $50 of his own.
Y has the discretion to invest the money as he sees fit. X and Y
share in the profits.
c. X places $100 with Y, his broker. Y has the discretion to
invest the money as he sees fit. Y provides the same service
for a number of other investors, combining the invested funds
and investing for the benefit of all.
Example a causes the most problems, with the central dispute being
over whether there exists a "common enterprise," or whether the scheme
is merely an investment operated through an agent. Maheu v. Reynolds
& Co. 8 involved a discretionary commodities account. Defendants argued
that no "investment contract" existed, even though the account was
managed and supervised by defendants in all respects, because defendant
did not offer to large numbers of investors the "opportunity to invest
in a pooled fund or common enterprise." 4 The court looked to Howey
to see if pooling was essential and noted that in no instance had there
been the sale of a right to share with others in the profits of land held
in common with the Howey company or other purchasers. The Makeu
court then concluded that the discretionary account, even without pool-
ing, was a "security.""8
This analysis has a major flaw. It is true that in Howey the pur-
chaser did not receive a share of the profits from the entire operation.
But, while his income was determined by the output of his own tract,
that produce was pooled for marketing by the Howey company. The
profit to the investor was influenced to a large extent by the costs of
the Howey operation, since "[s]uch tracts gain utility as citrus groves
only when cultivated and developed as component parts of a larger
area."8" Certainly, if to the purchasers in Howey "individual development
of the plots of land .. .would seldom be economically feasible due to
their small size,"87 the Howey company could not afford to care for each
individual small parcel as a separate entity.
In effect, Howey represents a "securities" question in which the
analysis turns to agency questions. A common enterprise exists when
some other person has an interest in the operation, with a resulting
diminution of the purchaser's control over his financial fortunes. But,
if the other person in the scheme is merely the investor's agent, there is
no such diminution since the agent is subject to the principal's control.8"
33. 282 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
34. Id. at 429.
35. For a similar analysis and result, see Gould v. Barnes Brokerage Co., 345 F. Supp.
294 (N.D. Tex. 1972); Berman v. Orimex Trading, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Oil Lease Serv., Inc. v. Stephenson, 162 Cal. App. 2d 100, 327 P.2d 628 (1958). See also
Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970), in which apparently no
"pooling" was involved.
36. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300 (1946).
37. Id. at 300.
38. "Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent
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If the Howey company were merely the agent of the investor, it could
well be argued that no "security" existed;" 9 but, in fact, whatever
agency control might have existed in a purchaser of the tracts was
diluted by the presence in the scheme of other "principals" to whom the
"agent" was responsible. Thus, the "common enterprise" resulted from
diminution of the principal-agent factor of control.
The Seventh Circuit picked up this line of analysis in Milnarik v.
M-S Commodities, Inc.,40 in which the plaintiff sought to rescind a dis-
cretionary trading account in commodities futures. The court found "the
element of commonality"41 to be absent:
Although the complaint does allege that [defendant] entered
into similar discretionary arrangements with other customers,
the success or failure of those other contracts had no direct
impact on the profitability of plaintiff's contract. [Defendant's]
various customers were represented by a common agent, but
they were not joint participants in the same investment enter-
42prise.
"In essence this contract creates an agency-for-hire
rather than constituting the sale of a unit of a larger enter-
prise. . ....
The court concluded that "we do not believe an investor who grants
discretionary authority to his broker thereby joins the broker's other
customers in the kind of common enterprise that would convert the
agency relationship into a statutory security.
'44
While Example a, supra, raises serious problems, Examples b and c
are much more easily resolved. Example b basically reflects the scheme
by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control,
and consent by the other to so act." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AcENCY § 1(1), at 7
(1957).
Agents may be "servants"--whose physical activities are subject to control by the
principal ("master")-or "non-servants"; some independent contractors are agents. Al-
though their physical conduct is not subject to control by the principal, these agents owe
duties to the principal even if he has contracted to permit the agent to exercise free dis-
cretion. Id. § 14(b) at 60. Typical of the "independent contractor" type of agent are the
broker, the attorney-at-law, and the auctioneer. d. § 1, comment e at 11.
39. There being no "common enterprise" or expectation of profits "solely from the
efforts of others."
40. 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1972). For the same analysis (agency and not "security"),
also see Wasnowic v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 352 F. Supp. 1066 (M.D. Pa. 1972); Dame v.
Lee, 180 Ga. 315, 178 S.E. 752 (1935).
41. Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 276 (7th Cir. 1972).
42. Id. at 276-77.
43. Id. at 277, quoting with approval Miinarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 320 F. Suppl.
1149, 1151 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
44. Id. at 279. See also State v. Brill, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 70,901 and g 70,918 (Wis.,
Dane County Cir. Ct. 1971), in which defendant managed small parcels of land that had
been sold to the public. As in Howey, the purchaser did not obtain a percentage of the
entire operation; rather, defendant "managed the sum total of the properties for the benefit
of all." Id. 70,918, at 67,115. And see an analogous scheme and result in SEC v. Lake
Havasu Estates, 340 F. Supp. 1318 (D. Minn. 1972).
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of State v. Hofacre." In agency terms, this arrangement is classified as a
"power coupled with an interest" or, as the Restatement (Second) of
Agency puts it, a "power given as security."" In such a relationship, the
principal's power to end the relationship is decreased.47
Here the "common enterprise" is between the purchaser and the
broker in his individual capacity. The broker, as agent, is responsible to
more than one principal. Thus, the purchaser's control is diminished and
his important power of termination is restricted: with the diminution of
control comes the "common enterprise," and the "security" is much
easier to find.
Example c reveals how, through a slight alteration of the economic
relationships within a given scheme, a mere agency can be converted into
something akin to an interest in a mutual fund.48 In a similar situation,
the court in SEC v. Wickkam,49 which involved a commingled fund
arrangement, raised this example:
If we assume, for instance, that a race track habitue invites the
public to pool its funds with him, and, in return for the various
sums deposited, he issues a certificate entitling each holder to
participate proportionately in the earnings that may result from
his wagers with such money by reason of his knowledge, ex-
perience, and possible inside tips on horse races, it would not
seem that one would have any difficulty in characterizing such
transaction as the issuance of an investment contract, or as a
participation in a profit-sharing agreement .... 50
The presence in the scheme of other "principals" to whom the agent
is accountable diminishes the control any one investor might have over
his fortunes. A "security" results.
2. Condominiums
The presence of "security" problems involving condominium units
was perhaps inadvertently predicted by the Supreme Court of Maine,
when, in an early decision, it stated that the Blue Sky Law was designed
to prevent swindles promising to "sell building lots in the blue sky in
fee simple." 5' The SEC has stated its views52 on the applicability of the
federal acts to offers and sales of condominiums or units in real estate
developments. Dealing mainly with condominium promotions, the Com-
45. 206 Minn. 167, 288 N.W. 13 (1939).
46. RESTATIMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 138, at 339 (1957).
47. Id. § 139.
48. See generally Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 274 F. Supp. 624 (D.D.C. 1967), rev'd,
420 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1969), rev'd, 401 U.S. 617 (1970).
49. 12 F. Supp. 245 (D. Minn. 1935). See also Anderson v. Francis I. duPont & Co.,
291 F. Supp. 705 (D. Minn. 1968).
50. SEC v. Wickham, 12 F. Supp. 245, 248 (D. Minn. 1935).
51. State v. Cushing, 137 Me. 112, 115, 15 A.2d 740, 743 (1940).
52. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5347 (Jan. 10, 1973) (BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP.,
No. 184, D-1 (1973).
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mission raised three possible schemes, all of which must be analyzed in
light of the "common enterprise" and "agency" problems raised in the
"discretionary account" cases.
The first scheme involves the offer and sale of condominiums ac-
companied by a rental arrangement, where the emphasis is on the eco-
nomic benefits that might accrue to the purchaser from the efforts of
the promoter or a third party. In this type of promotion, the purchaser
is told that he can arrange to have his unit managed and rented to others
by some party, who is either the promoter or is "designated or arranged
for by the promoter."
The Commission's contention is that by requiring the purchaser to
utilize the efforts of a particular rental service, an investment contract
results. This contention requires a greater depth of analysis. If there is
no "common enterprise," then the situation resembles Milnarik, in which
it was pointed out that even though several parties utilized the same
agent, there was no relationship between the investments of the various
participants. A "common enterprise" could well be developed along these
lines: Proof should be adduced to the effect that the servicing of an
individual unit is economically unfeasible; that it is essential to a suc-
cessful venture to have a particular rental service so that access can be
obtained not only to the common areas but also to the various units
themselves, so that the entire operation can be run to the benefit of all.
In short, the scheme must be revealed to be analogous to Howey, where
the profits are directly related to operational costs and operational costs
are minimized through efficient "cultivation" of the realty as a single unit.
Such proof would serve to diffuse any "agency" control by the purchaser
and would give life to a "common enterprise."
The Commission's second example involves the sale of a condominium
coupled with participation in a pooling arrangement. Here, the purchaser
actually occupies his unit; but on occasions when he will be away from
the premises for an appreciable period of time, he contributes his unit
to the pool of vacant units that are available to be leased to others. A
management company operates the leasing operation and the unit owners
share in the profits, usually apportioned by the number of hours that
their particular unit was available in the pool, regardless of whether it
was actually rented. The "common enterprise" is much clearer here and
a ''security" exists.
The third example offered by the Commission involves the sale of a
condominium coupled with a condition that the purchaser must hold his
unit available for rental for a designated period, or must use an exclusive
rental agent. The mandatory requirements of such a plan tend to create
a "common enterprise." The utilization of a rental agent could be viewed
merely as a manifestation of individual control that accompanies owner-
ship of a unit, but where the exercise of free choice is abolished and an
exclusive agent is appointed by the vendor, it becomes more apparent
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that the entire operation will be conducted for the benefit of all, and
something other than a mere agency results.
The Commission concluded its analysis by stating that no "security"
will be involved if, after purchasing his unit, the owner enters into a
non-pooled rental arrangement with an agent neither designated nor
required to be used as a condition to the purchase, whether or not such
agent is affiliated with the seller. This conclusion recognizes that an
investment operated through an agent, when the principal's control is not
diluted in some manner, is not an investment in a "security."
Therefore, in discretionary account cases as well as in condominium
cases, the problem that is troubling-or should be troubling-the courts
is whether the investor has given up control over his chances for success.
Findings of fact as to the terms of the "agency" should be crucial. A
broker, for example, is recognized as the type of agent denominated as
an "independent contractor. '5 3 While the principal-investor may not have
control over the physical activities of the agent,54 other circumstances
could reveal ultimate agency control. Additionally, in a situation in which
the investor turns over control to the broker, the act of turning over
discretion can be viewed as an exercise of the control vested in the
principal.r5
Of great aid to the courts has been the factor of the size of the
interest conveyed. The fact that the interest conveyed is incapable of
individual exploitation is an excellent clue that the purchaser is looking
forward to participating in a common enterprise. The factor of impos-
sibility of individual exploitation will defeat an "agency" argument;
for if any effort to exploit the asset would be fruitless, it is difficult to
see why an "agent" would assume the task. In Howey, because the
transferred tracts were incapable of individual exploitation, the pur-
chasers looked forward to sharing in the prosperity produced by the
entire grove operation. The same aspect shows up in Joiner-type opera-
tions. A Joiner operation utilizes a step-transaction to disguise the
"common enterprise." First, the purchasers buy small parcels near the
drill site. These parcels-either the land itself, or mineral leases-are
too small to be exploited individually. Step two reveals the obvious intent
of the parties: When a well is drilled, the parcel owners exchange their
holdings for a royalty interest in the well. " In Moore v. Stella,57 for
example, defendant sold the mineral rights to small parcels in a wilder-
ness of undeveloped and unproven acreage. The court focused on the
real issue quite accurately, noting that the question was
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1, comment e (1957).
54. Id. § 2.
55. See a similar successful argument in Moulin v. Der Zakarian, 191 Cal. App. 2d 184,
12 Cal. Rptr. 572 (4th Dist. 1961). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 146,
425 (1957).
56. And hence the "common enterprise" comes into view. As one court has put it,
"the deed is a mere disguise." People v. Daniels, 25 Cal. App. 2d 64, 69, 76 P.2d 556, 558
(2d Dist. 1938).
57. 52 Cal. App. 2d 766, 127 P.2d 300 (2d Dist. 1942).
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whether, in practical effect, the scheme under which the deeds
were given contemplated and involved investment by the pur-
chasers in an enterprise or venture conducted by others for
earnings and profits or, more specifically, whether investors
were led to part with their money upon the promise and in the
expectation that they would be able at some future time to lease
their interests to some oil company upon a royalty basis .... 15
Promoters have tried to build a record through ploys such as giving
the grantee rights of ingress and egress for drilling or mining.59 This
tactic is designed to create a facade that individual exploitation is pos-
sible, and that no participation in a "common enterprise" is anticipated.
But if the units are too small, this extra gift will be disregarded and the
obvious intent of the parties will prevail.60
The "lack of expertise" on the part of the purchasers is another
evidentiary feature that is probative of whether the parties intended to
transfer an interest in a "common enterprise." If the purchaser knows
nothing about raising oranges or drilling oil wells, a presumption that
the parties were contemplating an interest in a "common enterprise"
should arise. However, this factor should be subordinated in weight to
the presumptions arising from the physical characteristics of the unit.
A purchaser may be ignorant about drilling wells, but, if the parcel
conveyed is capable of exploitation, the purchaser might well hire agents
to exploit it for him. Since no other parcels would be necessary, no
"common enterprise" would exist, and the purchaser would retain control
over his chances through his "principal-agent" powers.
At this point it should be apparent that all of the characteristics of
a "common enterprise" could easily be integrated into the element of
expecting profits "solely from the efforts of others." If there is no "com-
mon enterprise," the purchaser must look to his own efforts, or the
efforts of his agents, and, in actuality, he is relying on himself. If the
parcel is incapable of individual exploitation, the purchaser envisions
reliance on the efforts of others, as well as participation in a "common
enterprise." One court has equated these two elements by stating that
since the facts of the case showed that reliance upon the efforts of others
was "unjustified and unreasonable," there were no elements of a "com-
mon enterprise" present."'
It seems to make no difference whether the "control" question is
approached from the "common enterprise" path or through the avenue
of "expecting profits solely from the efforts of others." In either approach,
the emphasis must be on whether the investor loses control. The lower
court in Investment Co. Institute v. Camp,62 explained the essence of
58. Id. at 771-72, 127 P.2d at 302.
59. See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 24 Cal. App. 2d 182, 74 P.2d 1085 (1st Dist. 1938).
60. Id.; People v. Leach, 106 Cal. App. 442, 290 P. 131 (2d Dist. 1930).
61. Darwin v. Jess Hickey Oil Corp., 153 F. Supp. 667, 672 (N.D. Tex. 1957).
62. 274 F. Supp. 624 (D.D.C. 1967), rev'd, 420 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1969), rev'd, 401
U.S. 617 (1970).
1973]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVII
Howey: "[W]henever an investor relinquishes control over his funds
and submits their control to another for the purpose and hopeful expecta-
tion of deriving profits therefrom he is in fact investing his funds in a
security."'"
At this point, then, Howey can be restated as follows:
A "security" has been issued when the purchaser invests his
money (or other consideration that is acting merely as a me-
dium of exchange) in a common enterprise in which others
have an interest in the subject matter so that the purchaser's
principal-agent control is diluted, and is led to expect profits
solely from the efforts of other persons.
3. THERE MUST BE AN "EXPECTATION OF PROFIT"
The importance of this element is that it serves to distinguish situa-
tions in which one purchases an interest in a profit-generating enterprise
from situations in which one purchases for his own consumption. The
key is that if one takes possession and exploits his purchase, then any
profits that eventually accrue will be due to his own efforts. He will
remain in control of his chances for success. "Expectation of profit"
problems are found most often in cases involving real estate interests,
usually in the nature of housing units or cemetery plots.
Hacker v. Goldberg4 states the general rule. There, the purchaser
bought a membership in a country club which entitled him only to the
use of the facilities; he was in no way entitled to dividends or profits, or
anything above the quid pro quo of his money for his enjoyment of the
premises. No "security" was found:
We think the act intended to prohibit the sale unless its provi-
sions were complied with, of securities from which income or
profit was expected to be derived . . . and not for an interest
in a club from which no financial profit or income could be
derived ... 
The New Jersey decision in Maplewood Village Tenants Ass'n v.
Maplewood Village,"0 states the reason behind the general rule:
To place the purchaser of an apartment, made for the purpose
of serving as a personal residence, within the coverage of the act
would be illogical. The reasoning is that there is no entrusting of
investment capital to a third party for the purpose of manage-
ment or investment thereof, for the purpose of income genera-
tion or capital gain. When purchasing a condominium the buyer
63. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 274 F. Supp. 624, 642 (D.D.C. 1967), rev'd, 420
F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1969), rev'd, 401 U.S. 617 (1970).
64. 263 Ill. App. 73 (1931).
65. Id. at 76-77.
66. 116 N.J. Super. 358, 282 A.2d 428 (Ch. 1971).
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is afforded personal control of his investment, as opposed to the
securities investor whose investment may be controlled by
third parties .... I
Although some plaintiffs have vainly tried to have the ordinary
installment land sales contract construed as a "security,'0 8 "[t]he offer
of real estate, as such, without any collateral arrangements with the
Seller or others, does not involve the offer of a security." 9 It is the
"collateral arrangement" which creates the "security." Thus, a unit in
a cooperative apartment, when purchased for actual occupancy, does
not involve the sale of a security.70 In sharp contrast to the "actual
occupancy" cases are schemes such as the one involved in Sire Plan
Portfolios v. Carpentier.71 There, the seller purchased an apartment
building in New York City and offered 280 "units of ownership." The
seller would conduct the operations of the enterprise, with profits dis-
tributed pro rata to the owners. The "units" clearly were evidences of
an interest in a "common enterprise" run by the seller, and were, there-
fore, "securities.
' 72
Cemetery plots present more difficult problems, since the dissatisfied
plaintiff usually has not yet taken occupancy. In the housing unit cases,
generally the presence or absence of a lease or actual occupancy is of
evidentiary value. But with cemetery lots, the parties' intent must be
determined from other indicia. The courts give special scrutiny to the
presence of bulk purchases and representations that the purchase will
appreciate in value. Thus, in State v. Lorentz,73 where some purchasers
bought over 100 lots, the court concluded that "[i]t is evident from the
number of burial lots sold to different purchasers that they were not sold
or purchased primarily for burial purposes of the buyer or his family....
They were purchased for resale." 4 But the absence of volume purchases
can dictate an opposite result.
75
This sort of analysis-based on the intent of the purchaser-does
not even come into play under the theory in Holloway v. Thompson.76
The court there stated:
The owner of a cemetery lot is in a somewhat different position
than the owner of an ordinary parcel of real estate. . . . [H]is
67. Id. at 379, 282 A.2d at 432.
68. See, e.g., In re McCormick's Estate, 284 Ill. App. 543, 1 N.E.2d 769 (1936).
69. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5347 (Jan. 10, 1973) (BNA SEc. REo. & L. REP.
No. 184, D-1 (1973); but see the discussion of cemetery plots infra, this section.
70. See, e.g., State v. Hirsch, 101 Ohio App. 425, 131 N.E.2d 419 (1956); State v.
Silverberg, 166 Ohio St. 101, 139 N.E.2d 342 (1956); Brothers v. McMahon, 351 Ill. App.
321, 115 N.E.2d 116 (1953).
71. 8 Ill. App. 2d 354, 132 N.E.2d 78 (1956).
72. See also Foreman v. Holsman, 10 Ill. 2d 551, 141 N.E.2d 31 (1957).
73. 221 Minn. 366, 22 N.W.2d 313 (1946).
74. Id. at 368, 22 N.W.2d at 314.
75. See, e.g., Memorial Gardens v. Love, 5 Utah 2d 270, 300 P.2d 628 (1956).
76. 112 Ind. App. 229, 42 N.E.2d 421 (1942).
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relation to the corporation having supervision over the cemetery
is in many respects that of corporation and shareholder, the in-
terest . . . being represented by lots instead of stock.77
Under this theory, then, even the absence of bulk purchases would
not be decisive; the single-lot purchasers would merely be minority share-
holders. At a total variance with the theory is the dissent in State v.
Lorentz78 which emphasized the lack of profit-sharing and in essence
found no interest in an enterprise to exist.
The crucial factor appears to be a dispute over the services that will
be rendered by the cemetery corporation. The care and maintenance
can be viewed either as the normal duties necessary to create a proper
atmosphere for the final resting place, or they can be viewed as the
"collateral arrangement" that usually changes a purchase of realty into
a security transaction. The problem is that no one ever buys a cemetery
plot without the arrangements that the cemetery will be kept in proper
condition. Thus, it must be determined whether something beyond the
usual collateral arrangements has been sold. This, in turn, returns us to
the representations that have been made. For example, the normal inci-
dents, when coupled with a promise to resell the plot at a profit to the
purchaser, tend to create a "security."7" Similarly, inducements based
on a resale market will cause the transaction to fall within the scope
of the securities acts.8
In short, then, the normal incidents to the purchase of a cemetery
lot should not convert a purchase of realty into a "security," for even
if the vendor's efforts in maintaining the cemetery do cause appreciation
in value, the purchaser has not entrusted his funds in order to obtain
such appreciation. He has entrusted his funds in order to procure the
services, and not the profit that happens to accrue; he expects nothing
beyond quid pro quo, his money for land and maintenance. Services or
representation beyond the normal will indicate that the purchaser has
entrusted his funds not for the services but for the profit that will accrue
from the services.
Therefore, the prudent counselor involved in this area would do
well to advise against a sales plan based on profit-expectation. Also, such
an approach will most likely serve to discourage bulk purchases, as well
as the chances of coming within the coverage of the securities acts.
4. THERE MUST BE AN EXPECTATION THAT PROFITS WILL
RESULT "SOLELY FROM THE EFFORTS OF OTHERS"
a. Why "solely"? Partnerships and joint ventures
The "solely" requirement is the key to understanding exactly what
type of animal is involved in a "security." A "security" is merely a varia-
77. Id. at 239, 42 N.E.2d at 425.
78. 221 Minn. 366, 374, 22 N.W.2d 313, 316 (1946) (dissenting opinion).
79. See, e.g., State v. Cushing, 137 Me. 112, 15 A.2d 740 (1940).
80. See, e.g., In re Waldstein, 160 Misc. 763, 291 N.Y.S. 697 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
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tion of other possible types of business arrangements. It is an economic
relationship between the parties, and, as such, has its own parameters
and identifying characteristics, as do all of the other types of business
relationships. As was demonstrated in the discussion involving the "com-
mon enterprise," an agency relationship can be transformed into a "secu-
rity" relationship by adjusting the variables involved. The same process
can occur with other business arrangements.
A true partnership interest can never be a "security."'" The reason
is clear: a true partner retains some control over his chances for success.
The same is true of a joint adventure:
In such situations, the member of the enterprise pools his money
with that of others in the group; he has an equal right of control
over the project and the opportunity and right to know what is
going on. Because of this, the protection of the full disclosure
offered by registration is not needed as it is in cases involving
a non-participating investor.8 2
The problems arise, of course, in piercing form to get to the sub-
stance. It is clear that a partnership interest that does not convey some
control over the investor's chances for success will come within the
coverage of the acts. One well reasoned test requires participation by all,
sharing of profits and losses, and a community of interest in the control
of partnership affairs.83
Limited partnership interests have come under heavy attack.8 4 A
"true" limited partnership interest is not a "security.""8 The problem,
once again, is to determine what characteristics of control the general
partner must surrender. Some jurisdictions require, in addition to the
right to participate in the conduct of the enterprise, that. the element of
mutual selection of partners (delectus personarum) exist, so that interests
81. See, e.g., Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d 430 (10th Cir. 1973); Moulin v. Der Zakarian,
191 Cal. App. 2d 184, 12 Cal. Rptr. 572 (4th Dist. 1961); Hanneman v. Gratz, 170 Minn.
38, 211 N.W. 961 (1927).
82. Polikoff v. Levy, 55 Il1. App. 2d 229, 234, 204 N.E.2d 807, 809 (1965). See also
People v. Jacques, 137 Cal. App. 2d 823, 291 P.2d 124 (1st Dist. 1955) ; Osuna v. Russell,
176 Cal. App. 2d 92, 1 Cal. Rptr. 289 (4th Dist. 1959).
83. Moulin v. Der Zakarian, 191 Cal. App. 2d 184, 12 Cal. Rptr. 572 (4th Dist. 1961).
84. This is especially true in real estate syndications. See, e.g., Rivlin v. Levine, 195
Cal. App. 2d 13, 15 Cal. Rptr. 587 (2d Dist. 1961); Curtis v. Johnson, 92 I1. App. 2d 141,
234 N.E.2d 566 (1968) ; Polikoff v. Levy, 55 Ill. App. 2d 229, 204 N.E.2d 807 (1965) (real
estate joint venture) ; Conroy v. Schultz, 80 N.J. Super. 443, 194 A.2d 20 (Ch. 1963).
85. See, e.g., Farnsworth v. Nevada-Cal Mgmt., Ltd., 188 Cal. App. 2d 382, 10 Cal.
Rptr. 531 (2d Dist. 1961); Garbo v. Hilleary Franchise Sys., Inc., 479 S.W.2d 491 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1972). Even these results are cast in doubt by section 7 of the UNtFORM LD41TED
PARTNERsip AcT, which provides that a limited partner who takes part in the control
of the business will be liable as a general partner. While an interest represented by such
a position might not be a "security," under the definition of this Act a true limited part-
nership must be "security" since, as such, the limited partner is excluded from participation.
It could be contended, however, that the other sections of the Act that give the right of
full access and disclosure to limited partners remove such an interest from the provisions
of the securities acts. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 620.07, .10 (1971).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVII
are not indiscriminately and widely offered.81 Inactive limited partnership
interests are almost certain to come within the purview of the acts. 7
Interests in a "joint venture" are argued along the same lines as
partnership interests:
It is said ... that such an enterprise differs from a partnership
because it relates only to a single transaction. . . . There must
be ... a community of interest as well as some control over the
subject matter ... 88
The key, then, is to keep some "measure of control in the hands of
the members."89 Of evidentiary value is the presence or absence of active
participation and knowledge or lack of knowledge about the subject
matter.90 However, in the area of delectus personarum, one prominent
case has applied a standard that is far less stringent than that applied
to partnership interests: "[T] he fact that the plaintiff did not know the
identity of or formally approve the admission of members to the venture
after he joined it, does not preclude the existence of a joint venture." 91
Therefore, the "solely" requirement serves the same purpose as the
''common enterprise" element: When the investor retains some degree
of control over his chances for success, the economic relationship is
something other than a "security."
b. Who are the others from whom profits are to come?
As was discussed in the "common enterprise" section,92 if the
"others" are mere agents there is no loss of control, and hence no
"security." But what if the "others" are not the promoters of the scheme?
The following examples will serve to illustrate this area:
86. See, e.g., Rivlin v. Levine, 195 Cal. App. 2d 13, 15 Cal. Rptr. 587 (2d Dist. 1961);
Farnsworth v. Nevada-Cal Mgmt., Ltd., 188 Cal. App. 2d 382, 10 Cal. Rptr. 531 (2d
Dist. 1961).
87. See, e.g., People v. Rankin, 160 Cal. App. 2d 93, 325 P.2d 10 (2d Dist. 1958);
People v. Hoshor, 92 Cal. App. 2d 250, 206 P.2d 882 (2d Dist. 1949); People v. Woodson,
78 Cal. App. 2d 132, 177 P.2d 586 (2d Dist. 1947); People v. Dutton, 41 Cal. App. 2d
866, 107 P.2d 937 (2d Dist. 1940); Curtis v. Johnson, 92 Ill. App. 2d 141, 234 N.E.2d
566 (1968) ; Conroy v. Schultz, 80 N.J. Super. 443, 194 A.2d 20 (Ch. 1963).
88. Hathaway v. Porter Royalty Pool, Inc., 296 Mich. 90, 102, 295 N.W. 571, 576
(1941). See also Grabendike v. Adix, 335 Mich. 128, 55 N.W.2d 761 (1952), utilizing a
test of sharing of profits and losses, contribution by all to a common undertaking, and a
community of interest in and control over the subject matter; and Brown v. Cole, 155 Tex.
624, 291 S.W.2d 704 (1956), relying on community of interest, participation, and joint
control of the enterprise.
89. Hathaway v. Porter Royalty Pool, Inc., 296 Mich. 90, 104, 295 N.W. 571, 577
(1941). See also Polk v. Chandler, 276 Mich. 527, 268 N.W. 732 (1936).
90. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Paramount Oil Co., 143 Cal. App. 2d 215, 300 P.2d 329
(2d Dist. 1956) (alleged joint venturers had total lack of knowledge about oil operations).
But see People v. Miller, 192 Cal. App. 2d 414, 13 Cal. Rptr. 260 (2d Dist. 1961), and
Oakley v. Rosen, 76 Cal. App. 2d 310, 173 P.2d 55 (2d Dist. 1946), a pair of California
decisions in which a "joint venture" claim received more credit than probably was due.
91. Polikoff v. Levy, 55 Ill. App. 2d 229, 235, 204 N.E.2d 807, 810 (1965).
92. Section II, B, 2 supra.
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a. X purchases Blackacre from V. Y makes no representa-
tions as to the chances that Blackacre will increase in value.
X's purchase is motivated by his own analysis of economic
conditions in the area; he thinks it is a "good buy" and will
appreciate in value even if he makes no improvements on the
premises.
b. X buys a small parcel of land from Y. Y states that an oil
well may be drilled by Z on some adjacent property in the
near future. Y has no control over Z.
Example a will not give rise to a "security." Although X will receive
a profit when the land appreciates in value, and this increase will result
from the efforts and activities of "others," the "others" are the amor-
phous entity that we might label as "the market." Economic factors
throughout the country may be responsible for X's profit. His profit will
result from the activities of unknown and unpredictable persons. In
reality, X will profit, if at all, from his own efforts in reading the market
conditions. Thus, he is relying on himself, and not on "others," for a
successful investment; for the same reason, there is no "common enter-
prise."
As the "others" from whom profits are to result become more
discernible, the chances of a finding of a "security" increase. Example b
touches on some of these problems. As a starting point, the language in
Joiner is helpful. In describing the sale of the small parcels there in-
volved, where the well was to be drilled by the issuer, the Court noted
that "the drilling of this well was not an unconnected or uncontrolled
phenomenon to which salesman pointed merely to show the possibilities
of the offered leases."93 This hint-that "unconnected or uncontrolled
others" will not give rise to a "security"-has been severely curtailed.
As the court stated in Roe v. United States:94
In Howey the element of expectation of "profits solely from the
efforts of the promoter or a third party" .. . certainly overcomes
any imputation that language in Joiner that the "drilling of this
well was not an unconnected or uncontrolled phenomenon" etc.
meant to require that the collateral activity be that of the seller
or one under his control.9
93. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 348 (1943).
94. 287 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1961).
95. Id. at 439 n.5. See also Continental Marketing Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th
Cir. 1967); Craft v. Brooks, 204 Cal. App. 2d 187, 191-92, 22 Cal. Rptr. 68, 71 (2d Dist.
1962):
The adjudged cases have given the phrase "from activities of other persons" a
broad meaning and application extending to situations in which the buyer of the
oil interest expected to reap his reward through participating in the excitement
arising from bringing in a wildcat well upon property in the general area, especially
upon an adjacent parcel.
See also SEC v. Orange Grove Tracts, 210 F. Supp. 81, 83 (D. Mass. 1962): "The fact
that that third party may be legally distinct from the defendants does not bring the activity
outside the coverage of Section 5(a)."
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Some courts have taken a stricter view. For example, in Union Land
Associates v. Ussher,90 the purchaser of oyster beds was told that he
could become a member of an oyster cooperative which would market the
oysters. The seller had no connection at all with the cooperative:
In the instant case there was no sale of any security or "invest-
ment contract" within the meaning of the act. There was no
obligation on the part of the plaintiff vendor to do anything
under the contract other than deliver the deed upon payment
of the purchase price. Neither was the contract of purchase
connected with any promotion scheme involving the sharing of
expected profits. . . . Here the vendor had nothing whatever
'to do with the cultivation, harvesting, or sale of oysters."
What this problem of "connection with the seller" really means is
this: If the enterprise is connected with, or conducted by, the issuer, he
has sold an interest in his own venture. If the enterprise is not to be
conducted or controlled by the seller, he is merely selling securities in
someone else's venture. So the problem of "connection" is not crucial;
the real problem is whether or not what is sold is a "security"-and that
determination returns us once again to evidentiary characteristics such
as economic feasibility of individual exploitation. For example, if the
oyster beds in Ussher were incapable of individual exploitation, it could
well be argued that the bed was merely a disguise for an interest in the
marketing operation-a "security" in the venture of someone other than
the seller. But if the beds were capable of individual exploitation, the
act of turning them over to the marketing service would merely be a
manifestation of individual control and decision-making.
There are, therefore, several evidentiary characteristics at play in
the area of "others" being in some "connection with the seller." If the
"others" are not presently visible or reasonably predictable,9" and, there-
fore, not connected with the seller, a presumption may arise that the
purchaser is relying on his own forecasting skills. If the "others" are
in existence, a presumption might arise that the purchaser is relying on
them for his profit, whether or not the "others" are related to or con-
nected with the seller. But both of these presumptions may be overcome
by the nature of the interest conveyed. If the transferred asset is in-
capable of individual exploitation, "securities" have been sold even if the
"others" are not in existence.9" If the interest could be individually
exploited, "securities" may not have been sold, depending on other
representations, even if the "others" are connected with the seller.
96. 174 Ore. 453, 149 P.2d 568 (1944).
97. Id. at 458, 149 P.2d at 570.
98. In Darwin v. Jess H-ickey Oil Corp., 153 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Tex. 1957), the
seller made no collateral promise. "Reliance upon the efforts of others . . . was unjustified
and unreasonable," so no "securities" were sold. Id. at 672.
99. See, e.g., Moore v. Stella, 52 Cal. App. 2d 792, 127 P.2d 300 (2d Dist. 1942);
SPeoplev. Daniels, 25 Cal. App. 2d 64, 76 P.2d 556 (2d Dist. 1938).
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c. What kind of efforts?
This area presents the most intriguing problems of all and returns
us full circle to the "investment of money" problem.100 Basically, the
problem, as stated in that section, was to determine what sort of efforts
could properly be "merged" with invested funds, so as to result in a
"solely from the efforts of others" plan, without unnecessarily confusing
the realities of the "security" relationship.
The example posed in section II, B, 1, supra, was this:
d. The purchaser desires to purchase a tract from the
Howey Co., but he has insufficient funds and is required to
come down to the orange groves and work.
The problem, of course, is whether the work that is done can be
merged as "additional consideration," or whether it is of the type of
"effort" that prevents a "security" from existing. Basically, there are
three major types of "efforts" that can be involved in a given scheme.
The first type may be labeled a "sham" or "condition precedent" type of
effort. An example of this type of effort is where the purchaser must
perform a task such as "solving a puzzle or writing an essay."'' The
following example is illustrative:
X purchases a 10% interest in the profits of the Howey Co.
citrus operation; but in order to receive the proceeds of his
interest, he must run a four-minute mile.
This example reveals one important premise: "Profits solely from
the efforts of others" means profits to the venture in which the interest
has been sold and not necessarily profits to the investor. Here, the inves-
tor cannot receive any money without "working"; but no one would
contend that this condition precedent makes his 10% interest something
other than a security. The key is that he is not being paid for running
the mile; rather, he can realize a profit only if the individuals who are
to produce the fund-those responsible for running the citrus grove-
operate in a successful manner. A "sham" or "condition precedent"
effort is totally unrelated to the profit-generating functions of the enter-
prise from which profits are to come and in which the purchaser has
invested. Therefore, this sort of activity cannot serve to give any control
over his financial fortunes to the investor. Even if he breaks the world
record in the mile run, or runs hundreds of miles, his interest is in the
grove; if that operation does not prosper, he will receive nothing. This
type of effort can properly be merged with money invested, or it can
be disregarded entirely.
The second type of "effort" that might be involved in a program
100. See section II, B, 1 supra.
101. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 766, 775 (D. Ore. 1972),
aff'd, 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 117 (1973).
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can be labeled a "consideration effort." A "consideration effort" would
be similar to the following example:
X purchases a 10% interest in the Howey Co. operations,
paying partly in cash and partly by rendering personal services
to the president of the company; the services are unrelated to
the venture.
When the "consideration" efforts are unrelated to income produc-
tion, they cannot confer upon the investor any control over his chances
for success. Thus, they can properly be merged. However, the more
closely related the efforts are to the activities of the venture, the closer
the "securities" question becomes. Consider the following:
X purchases a 10% interest in the Howey Co. enterprise. He
pays partly in cash, and partly by rendering labor in the field.
An employee of the Howey Co. supervises him constantly,
telling him where to dig, how to plant, and how to cultivate.
This example raises the crucial question of independence. Because
the purchaser here has a position in the enterprise, it might be contended
that the "solely from the efforts of others" test is avoided; but, since the
investor's efforts are totally directed by the seller, they cannot be the
sort of efforts that give the purchaser some control over his financial
fortunes. The success of his agricultural efforts is dependent upon the
quality of the instructions and supervision supplied by the seller."02 This
"dependent" effort can properly be merged as "additional consideration"
and the interest is still a "security."
The third type of effort that may be involved may be labeled
"independent income-producing efforts." 1" This type of effort cannot be
merged with money paid in and treated as just another form of considera-
tion; to do so distorts the concept as well as the purpose of the act. As
was pointed out in Section II, B, 1, d, supra, merger of this sort of activity
could cast even true partnerships into the shadow of the acts. If the
purchaser is independently, inherently and inextricably caught up in
the income-producing activities of an enterprise so that he retains some
control over his chances for a successful investment, something other
than a "security" results. T'0 Howey recognizes this analysis when it states
that "profits" are to come "solely from the efforts of others."
102. This is not to say that independent operators cannot be trained by the seller prior
to becoming independent. See, e.g., Goldsmith v. American Food Serv., Inc., 123 Ga. App.
353, 181 S.E.2d 95 (1971).
103. A fourth possible type of effort might be one for which the investor receives an
entirely independent compensation, such as an employee's stock option plan, or the plan
in State v. Bushard, 164 Minn. 455, 205 N.W. 370 (1925). There, the investor received a
share in the profits of the business and also obtained employment as a bus driver, for
which he received wages. Similarly, in People v. Woodson, 78 Cal. App. 2d 132, 177 P.2d
586 (2d Dist. 1947), defendant sold fractional interests in a ranching operation, and the
investors received employment on the ranch for a separate and distinct wage.
104. One court has made this point quite succinctly: "Participation on the part of an
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d. Franchises, distribuotrships, and referral-sales
marketing plans-selling the right to sell
Franchises, distributorships, and referral-sales plans all have one
element in common: they spread the risk of a successful investment
over two parties. In the typical "securities" relationship, one person-
either the issuer or the third party who is to "drill the well"-bears all
of the responsibility for success. Hence, profits are dependent "solely on
the efforts" of someone other than the investor. In a franchise, distribu-
torship, or referral-sales program, however, the responsibility for success
is spread between the parent (franchisor) and the investor.
[a] "franchise" . . . has been defined as a contract by which a
person who desires to operate a business, the franchisee, ob-
tains from a business organization, the franchisor, the right
to use a trademark or trade name owned by the franchisor,
and agrees to operate his business in accordance with a uniform
plan of operation prescribed by the franchisor.0 5
It is apparent that the franchisee is dependent in a significant manner
upon the success of the franchisor. A Ford dealership would certainly
be in severe trouble, regardless of how hard the individual distributor
worked, if Ford Motor Co. failed. On the other hand, if the franchisee
does not operate properly, his individual enterprise will fail in spite of
the success of the franchisor.
The "inactive" distributor or franchisee presents the fewest problems.
United States v. Herr °6 is typical. There, the promoters sold distributor-
ships for motivational courses built around recordings and manuals. The
"inactive distributors" were promised that the promoters' sales force
would sell the records and manuals for them, issuing monthly earnings
checks to the investors. Howey was easily applied.
Once the franchisee-distributor-investor is a participant, though, the
cases become much closer. Some decisions travel under a quantitative
analysis, looking to how much the franchisee does; others, more properly,
look to the nature of the work done and to whether that work affords
some control of his fortunes to the investor. Chapman v. Rudd Paint &
Varnish Co.'07 involved the sale of a "turn key" distributorship for the
sale of "Run Guard," a substance designed to prevent runs in nylon
hosiery. The promotional literature contained representations "which
seem to minimize the amount of effort which a distributor must exert,
and maximize that which Rudd would contribute."'0 8 The literature
investor in a way which is not controlling or decisive in the profit-making aspects of the
business" will not preclude the existence of a "security." Venture Invest. Co., Inc. v.
Shaefer, 3 BLUE SxY L. REP. I 71,031 at 67,234 (D. Colo. 1972).
'105. Id. at 67,233.
106. 338 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1964).
107. 409 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1969).
108. Id. at 641.
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characterized the distributor as an "investor" and described the distribu-
torship as
a "Turn-Key" operation into which the investor merely steps,
whereupon he is immediately involved in ... a substantial and
profitable undertaking with a minimum obligation on his time
or resources....
On the other hand, the very fact that the brochure empha-
sizes the amount of assistance the company will provide implies
that the distributor is also to contribute an effort.'0 9
Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc."0 concentrated more
heavily upon the nature of the franchisee's efforts. In the franchised
restaurant operation, the franchisor provided a trained manager and
retained the power to supervise:
Both the franchise agreement and the restaurant man-
ager's agreement contemplated that River City Steak would
play an active, if severely circumscribed, role in the conduct of
the restaurant. It is also evident that neither a manager nor
subsidiary personnel could be totally unresponsive to River City
Steak, which had the power to terminate their employment....
Even though a "turn-key" operation was sold, it remained the
sale of a business which the defendant could control and included
the normal risks incident to operation of any enterprise .... li
A "referral-sales marketing plan" is sometimes treated as a fran-
chise, but has important differences. This sort of scheme, which has been
characterized as "one of many sales rackets being carried on throughout
the nation which are giving public officials serious concern,""' has sur-
faced with increasing frequency in the past few years. Basically, the
"referral-sales agent" purchases an item-appliances, motivational courses
or what-have-you-and pays an additional stipend to belong to the
referral-sales program. As an agent, he then receives profit in the form
of "commissions" from sales that are made to his "prospects." The
''prospecting" can take various forms; the agent may merely provide
the company with a list of names, or he may be required to induce the
prospects to attend a central meeting, at which point the agent may or
109. Id. at 641. See also Goldsmith v. American Food Serv., Inc., 123 Ga. App. 353,
181 S.E.2d 95 (1971) ; State v. Heath, 199 N.C. 135, 153 S.E. 855 (1930).
110. 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972).
111. Id. at 669-70 (quoting trial court). See also Beefy Trail, Inc. v. Beefy King Int'l,
Inc., 348 F. Supp. 799 (M.D. Fla. 1972), in which a very sophisticated purchaser "actively
participated in the daily operation of the franchise, overseeing the restaurant's regular
operations, its advertising, kept the books and records, and regularly made business deci-
sions affecting the restaurant." Id. at 805.
112. Norman v. World Wide Distrib., Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 56-57, 195 A.2d 115, 117
(1963). The court here pointed out that the plaintiff's proof revealed that within twenty
months, the referral scheme would require 20 trillion salesmen.
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may not continue as a participant in attempting to "close" the sale.
One common scheme has operated around a "discount store"; in this
plan, the agent distributes cards to various persons, and receives a com-
mission from any sales made by "his" card holders. The "central meet-
ing" is replaced in this program by the "discount center." Often the
agents are told that they can set up their own sales force beneath them
and receive "override commissions" from sales made by others within
their organization. At this point, the scheme might properly be labeled
a "referral-sales plan coupled with a multi-level distributorship."
Courts that have attempted to handle these programs through a
Howey or Howey-related theory have battled with the problem of the
"efforts" expended by the "investors" along the lines delineated above:
Are the "efforts" proper for "merging" as consideration, or are they
of such a nature that they preserve for the investor a degree of control
over his chances for success? The problems arise from the characteristics
that differ from the ordinary franchise arrangement: If the "central
meeting"-be it a store, a "success meeting," or a "Go Tour"-fails, the
agent can "refer" all the people in Manhattan and not recoup a dime on
his investment. On the other hand, if the agents fail to produce prospects,
the central meeting can operate from now until eternity and not produce
a return for anyone.
Findings of fact are of utmost importance in these cases. What
the Howey-type jurisdictions are struggling with is this: Where is the
proper place to draw the boundaries of the sale process? Assuming inde-
pendence,113 are these agents actually a part of the sales process, the
process that produces the fund from which they will recoup their invest-
ment? Are they in a position through which they can exercise some
control over their chances for success? Or can their efforts be properly
merged as additional consideration, since their success so closely parallels
the activities and responsibilities of the parties conducting the "central
meeting?" There are strikingly different results, depending on one's
vantage point: Either the plan involves a chance for the agent to earn
money from his own efforts, or the plan is such a bad "security" that
the investor is not even entitled to a percentage of the profits of the
"central meeting." He invests his money, and as a condition to his receiv-
ing a return, the "coincidence" that the seller happens to make a sale
to one of the prospects supplied by the investor must occur. Under the
latter view, the plan resembles either an investment of money plus
"additional consideration," or the prior example in section II, B, 4, c,
supra, in which the investor purchases an interest in a venture, and, as
a condition to receiving a portion of the money generated by the seller,
he must "run a four-minute mile."
The varying results in the cases involving a "referral-sales marketing
plan," therefore, are in a large part attributable to the boundaries the
113. See section II, B, 4, c supra.
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courts have placed on the extent of the sales process. On similar facts,
courts have found that "[i]t is the Owner-Advertiser who makes the
very important contribution of the list of prospects. Every sales manager
in America would recognize the importance of this contribution to the
sales process"; 114 or that "all they would have to do would be to bring
other people to the Go-Tour ["central meeting"] and the program would
sell itself to them." ' Similarly, either the investor does not "stand to
profit from the future labors of others,"'n or
the effort required . . . in the distribution of the cards . . .
constitutes a minimal effort and the success of the proposed
store will depend upon the operation and management of the pro-
posed store and not upon the efforts of the [referral agents] ....
[T]he promoters in reality manage, control and operate [the
store] 117
Again as to quite similar promotions, one court has described the efforts
as "so limited that [the agents] are not even permitted to tell their
quarry the nature or purpose of the meeting,""" while another has found
them to be "fundamental and substantial," noting that the distributors
"take an active part in the meetings and actually attempt to convince
their prospects to join . ,n""' In short, the question of fact centers on
the investor-salesman's activities: Are they outside the sales process, or
is the role "not minimal or a mere walk-on, but one that occupied the
center of the stage for most of the play?"' 2 °
e. The "managerial efforts" theory
Perhaps the most noticeable offspring of the referral-sales programs
has been the "managerial efforts" theory. 12 ' This approach is initiated
with a threshold determination that the "sales process" does not include
the activities of the referral agents. This determination confines the sales
process to the activities of the "store" or "central meeting." It is then
concluded that the agent is subjecting his money "to the risks of an
114. Commonwealth v. Consumers Research Consultants, Inc., BLUE SKY L. REP.
1 70,631, at 66,352 (Penn., Mercer County Ct. C.P. 1963), aff'd, 414 Pa. 253, 199 A.2d 428
(1964).
115. Murphy v. Dare to Be Great, Inc., 3 BLUE SxY L. REP. f 71,053, at 67,278 (D.C.
Super. Ct. 1972).
116. Hurst v. Dare to Be Great, Inc., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. f 71,012, at 67,165 (D. Ore.
1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1973).
117. D.M.C. of Colorado v. Hays, 3 BLUE SxY L. REP. 1 70,897, at 67,041 (D. Colo.
1971).
118. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 766, 775 (D. Ore. 1972),
aff'd, 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 117 (1973).
119. SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 588 (N.D. Ga. 1973), appeal
docketed, No. 73-2339, 5th Cir., May 4, 1973.
120. Bruner v. State, 463 S.W.2d 205, 215 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
121. This theory traces its lineage to State v. Hawaii Market Centers, 52 Hawaii 642,
485 P.2d 105 (1971).
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enterprise over which he exercises no managerial control .... ."1" If
"managerial efforts" are equated with "independent income-producing
efforts," this theory works no change in the existing law. However, the
connotations of the term "managerial" open the door to classifying an ar-
rangement as a "security" if the "investor's" activities are not of the
type normally considered as being "managerial" in nature, even though
the "investor" has an active, independent role in the income-generating
activities so that he retains some control over his chances for success.
Indeed, at least one court has seen fit to walk through this door, stating
that the "efforts of others" element should be construed as meaning
"managerial efforts, and not purely physical efforts."" If the "mana-
gerial efforts" approach is applied on a case by case approach to deter-
mine whether the investor's activities preserve some control in him, the
label could be used constructively in place of tags such as "sham" or
"consideration" efforts.
III. THE "RISK CAPITAL" THEORY-A DIVERGENT CONCEPT: A
SECURITY Is DEFINED NOT BY THE INDUCEMENT HELD OUT
TO THE PURCHASER, BUT BY THE USE TO WHICH THE
FUNDS ARE PUT
No case in the area of securities regulation, aside from Howey
itself, has had an impact comparable to that of Silver Hills Country
Club v. Sobieski.'24 Prior to that decision, the California courts had
followed a basic Howey-type theory.1 5 In this one decision, Justice
Traynor broadened the scope of the securities acts, opening the door to
widespread regulation of economic arrangements that previously had
been considered to be outside the scope of the acts. In so doing, Traynor
broke completely with several fundamental principles.
In Silver Hills, the petitioners had entered into a contract to pur-
chase a 22-acre tract on which they were to build a country club. The
purchase price was $775,000, of which petitioners paid only a $400 down
payment. They took possession and began to make improvements by
sowing grass, installing a pool, remodeling, and adding showers, steam
rooms, and health and exercise equipment. Petitioners financed these
improvements in part by the sale of memberships in the club.
The plan was not the typical venture in which "memberships" were
merely a cover-up for an equity interest. The purchasers were to
122. Id. at 648, 485 P.2d at 109; identical language was used in SEC v. Glenn W.
Turner Enterprises, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ore. 1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 117 (1973).
123. State v. World Market Centers, 3 BLuE Sx L. REp. 1 71,034, at 67,237 (Okla,
Okla. Cty. Dist. Ct. 1972).
124. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961). The lower courts in Silver
Hills found the name to be quite appropriate, in view of the proposed golf course construc-
tion.
125. See, e.g., People v. Syde, 37 Cal. 2d 765, 235 P.2d 601 (1951).
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actually utilize their memberships by enjoying the facilities of the
club. Both the membership applications and the bylaws provided that a
member had no rights in the income or assets of the club.
Petitioners argued that the arrangement involved a purchase for
actual use, not for investment, since there was no profit expectation.
Under the Howey theory, this contention would have been decisive. 2 '
The lower court agreed, citing Hacker v. Goldberg,12 7 an Illinois deci-
sion that was absolutely on point. There, the plaintiff purchased a
membership in a country club that was in the process of being organized.
The corporate charter provided that no member was to receive dividends
or share in profits; thus, there was no expectation of profit. The Illinois
court held that the Blue Sky Law prohibited the sale of securities from
which income or profit was expected to be derived, but not the sale of
interests in a club that involved no financial participation.
Under a Howey-type theory, if the purchaser is to take possession,
his expectation is that any profits will come from his own efforts, and
thus he retains control over his financial fortunes. Silver Hills broke
sharply with these basic premises, and in a two-step analysis proceeded
to change the entire course of securities regulation.
First, the court relied heavily on an obscure section of the California
act that extended coverage even to non-interest bearing notes. Citing
this provision, Traynor stated:
It bears noting that the act extends even to transactions where
capital is placed without expectation of any material benefits.
... Since the act does not make profit to the supplier of capital
the test of what is a security, it seems all the more clear that
its objective is to afford those who risk their capital at least a
fair chance of realizing their objectives in legitimate ventures
whether or not they expect a return on their capital in one form
or another.'28
This break with one of Howey's principles was the foundation for
the court's major premise: That the Blue Sky Law "defines a security
broadly to protect the public against spurious schemes, however ingeni-
ously devised, to attract risk capital."1 ' In short, the Silver Hills court
concluded that risk capital could not be raised without involving the sale
of "securities."
This funding concept was bound to run a collision course with the
Howey principles. The first collision occurred in Silver Hills, where the
profit-expectation premise was destroyed. An even more serious collision
was quite foreseeable: Could a "security" exist even where the purchaser
126. See section II, B, 3 supra.
127. 263 Ill. App. 73 (1931).
128. Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 815, 361 P.2d 906, 908-09,
13 Cal. Rptr. 186, 188-89 (1961).
129. Id. at 814, 361 P.2d at 907, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
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depended on his own efforts, if his money served a funding purpose? If
the overriding criterion is the use to which the funds are put, how are
partnerships, joint ventures and franchise operations to be treated when
the monetary contributions provide the venture capital?
This particular conflict was brought to light in an opinion of the
Attorney General of California. Silver Hills lay relatively quiet until
1967 when the Attorney General issued an opinion that has had far-
reaching effects on decisions involving the applicability of the securities
acts to franchising arrangements. In the opinion, he proposed three
factual situations involving franchises: (1) The franchisee participates
only nominally in the franchised business in exchange for a share in the
profits; (2) The franchisee participates actively in the franchised busi-
ness and the franchiser agrees to provide certain goods and services to
the franchisee; (3) The franchisee participates actively in the franchised
business and the franchisor agrees to provide certain goods and services
to the franchisee, but the franchisor intends to secure a substantial por-
tion of the initial capital that is needed to provide such goods and services
from the fees paid by the franchisee or franchisees. 1 0
The Attorney General handled the first two examples through ap-
plication of a Howey-type theory: the first was a security and the second
was not. It was the third hypothetical situation that was the most
troublesome point. There, although profits were attributable to the fran-
chisee's own efforts, an "additional step" was said to be necessary to
determine if a "security" existed:
This method of analysis does not depend on the pecuniary profit
anticipated by the franchisee from the franchised business but
looks to the non-pecuniary benefits to be obtained from the
franchisor's agreement to provide goods and services for which
this initial capitalization is needed."'
Prior to Silver Hills, the Attorney General noted, the cases had
either stated or implied that pecuniary profit to the investor was an
essential element. He then concluded that the elements of lack of pecu-
niary profit and the presence of active investor participation did not
preclude the existence of a security under the Silver Hills test. Under
this analysis, then, even though the "investor" retains control over his
chances for success, a "security" can exist, depending on the uses to
which invested funds are put.
Following Silver Hills and the interpretative opinion of the Attorney
General, several other approaches surfaced, all traveling under the label
of the "risk capital theory." In Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak,
Inc., 8 2 plaintiff sold defendant a franchised restaurant operation under
130. 49 Op. ATn'y Ga.r. 124 (Cal. 1967).
131. Id. at 128.
132. 324 F. Supp. 640 (D. Colo. 1970), modified and aff'd, 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir.
1972) [hereinafter referred to as Mr. Steak].
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an arrangement that left a degree of control in the purchaser, with certain
controls designed to provide the seller assurances of product uniformity.
Since the franchisee was active in the venture, the ultimate conflict
between Howey and Silver Hills arose. The court considered Silver Hills
and the interpretations of the Attorney General and concluded that the
latter had gone too far:
While we consider the "risk capital" analysis appropriate in
some instances where franchises are involved, . . . [w]e also
realize that the franchisor's success and reputation depend upon
the performance, qualitative and quantitative, of the local fran-
chisee's operation. For that reason, the Attorney General's pro-
nouncement must be considered too extreme. We believe the
import of Sobieski and the better view would limit the 1933
Act to situations where exceptionally high risk, speculative
franchises are involved .... In other situations, we consider the
risk undertaken by the franchisee as incidental to the conduct
of his business.183
More in line with the Attorney General, but still in accord with the
"initial capitalization" theory of Mr. Steak and Silver Hills, was the
decision in State ex rel. Healy v. Consumer Business System, Inc.3 4 The
plan under scrutiny was a multi-level distributorship coupled with a
referral-sales marketing plan. Franchisees could sell defendant's product
and recruit others into the system as a part of the franchisee's organiza-
tion. Defendant's initial working capital was only $5,000.
The court acknowledged that the Howey test for a "security" could
not be met, and turned to Silver Hills and the attorney general's opinion,
noting that the third hypothetical situation (risk capital coupled with
active participation) was "similar to the situation which exists in the
case at bar."'31 The court reached a result contrary to that in Mr. Steak,
finding that "securities" had been sold despite active participation. Once
again, however, the test extended only to initial capitalization. The court
noted that the "risk capital" test gave protection by informing investors
that their capital would be risked "before the working foundations of the
enterprise are firmly in place."'3 0 The court concluded by holding that
"if a substantial portion of the initial capital which a franchisor uses to
initiate its operations is being provided by the franchisees, then the
franchisor must register his enterprise .... M87
133. Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640, 647 (D. Colo. 1970),
aff'd, 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972).
134. 5 Ore. App. 19, 482 P.2d 549 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as Consumer Busi-
ness System].
135. Id. at 27, 482 P.2d at 553.
136. Id. at 29, 482 P.2d at 554.
137. Id. at 29, 482 P.2d at 554. See also State v. American Campground, Inc., 3 BLUE
Sxy L. REP. g 71,064 (Ore., Multnomah Cty. Cir. Ct. 1972), following the Consumer Busi-
ness System test of initial capitalization quite carefully. But see Hurst v. Dare to Be Great,
Inc., 3 BLUE SKY L. RaP. f 71,012 (D. Ore. 1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1973), in
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By way of guidelines, the court approvingly cited a bulletin of the
California Corporation Commission 8 to the effect that an implication
of a "security" would arise if the franchisor cannot show:
(1) adequate capital to operate the franchising program for
an indefinite length of time, without the necessity of resorting
to the funds to be contributed by the franchisee; (2) success-
ful business operations in the past; and (3) adequate facilities
to successfully administer the franchising program.8 9
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court of Hawaii formulated its
theory, which, although under the "risk capital" label, curiously showed
signs of moving back toward Howey. State v. Hawaii Market Centers,
Inc.140 involved the sale of founders' contracts which were the basis of a
referral-sales plan and a multi-level distributorship program.' 4 ' The de-
fendant was capitalized with $1,000 and used the receipts from the sale
of distributorships to finance the opening of a retail discount store, to
which the sales personnel would refer their prospects. The court rejected
Howey as being "too mechanical to protect the investing public ade-
quately" and as being "based on a narrow concept of investor partici-
pation."' 4 2 The court also noted that the United States Supreme Court
had yet to deal with "an investment plan involving non-managerial in-
vestor participation .... ),143
Commenting that the "subjection of the investor's money to the
risks of an enterprise over which he exercises no managerial control is
the basic economic reality of a security transaction,' 4 the court set out
the following test:
(1) an offeree furnishes initial value to the offeror, and
(2) a portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of
the enterprise, and
(3) the furnishing of the initial value is induced by the offeror's
promises or representations which give rise to a reasonable un-
derstanding that a valuable benefit of some kind, over and
above the initial value, will accrue to the offeree as a result of
the operation of the enterprise, and
which the lower court twisted and distorted Consumer Business System in finding a
"security."
138. Cal. Div. of Corp. Bull. No. 67-8 (July 14, 1967).
139. State ex rel. Healey v. Consumer Business System, Inc., 5 Ore. App. 19, 30 n.10,
482 P.2d 549, 554 n.10 (1971).
140. 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as Hawaii Market
Centers].
141. See the plan described in section II, B, 4, d supra.
142. State v. Hawaii Market Centers, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 647, 485 P.2d 105, 108
(1971).
143. Id. at 647 n.3, 485 P.2d at 108 n.3.
144. Id. at 648, 485 P.2d at 109.
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(4) the offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical
and actual control over the managerial decisions of the enter-
prise. 45
While the court's comment that this test would provide coverage to
all forms of financing enterprises indicates that it is a type of "funding"
theory, several elements of this test are quite noteworthy. First, element
three is at odds with Silver Hills. Under Silver Hills, profit-expectation
is not required; but here the investor must expect something above and
beyond quid pro quo for his invested dollar. Additionally, element four
breaks with the attorney general's opinion so that active participation of
the proper type will preclude coverage. This test, as does Silver Hills',
looks to initial capitalization, but the similarity ends there. This is ac-
tually a "managerial efforts" test, and, in that respect, might be viewed
more as a refinement of Howey than as a spin-off of Silver Hills.4 '
The emphasis on "managerial efforts" was based on the court's
premise that minor investor participation is irrelevant, and that he must
have practical and actual control over the decision-making. Here, he had
no power to influence the utilization and accumulation of capital, nor
authority over decisions involving the operation of the store. On the
other hand, while having no voice in the running of the discount store,
the participant retained full decision-making power as to the conduct of
his own individual distributorship operation.
Just as Hawaii Market Centers had turned away from the strict
Silver Hills doctrine, subsequent cases turned in various directions from
the Hawaii Market Centers test. In State v. Glenn Turner Enterprises,
Inc.,47 the court expanded Silver Hills even further, noting that neither
Hawaii Market Centers nor Silver Hills would protect the investor from
a "well-heeled, corruption-minded company which had been in business
for a long time."' 4 s Thus, the court concluded, "a test which is restricted
to the obtaining of initial capital only, is not a satisfactory test."'4 The
"risk capital" test was held to include schemes to raise capital for exist-
145. Id. at 649, 485 P.2d at 109.
146. Nonetheless, the lower court in Turner Enterprises picked up the language in
Hawaii Market Centers that "the subjection of the investor's money to the risks of an
enterprise over which he exercises no managerial control is the basic economic reality of a
security transaction" and attributed it to Silver Hills, concluding that the "managerial efforts"
test is equivalent to a "risk capital" analysis:
Over ten years ago, the California Supreme Court articulated a test which simply
recognized that the subjection of the investors' money to the risk of an enterprise
over which he exercises no managerial control is the basic economic reality of a
security transaction. Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski ....
SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 766, 773 (D. Ore. 1972), aff'd
on "investment contract" issue, 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), 49 S. Ct. 117 (1973) (emphasis
added to show error).
147. 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. f 71,023 (Idaho 4th Dist. 1972).
148. Id. at 67,201.
149. Id. at 67,201.
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ing but unproven businesses as well as schemes to raise initial capital.
The court adopted this test:
(1) a common enterprise,
(2) expectation of monetary profit or some other benefit, and
(3) either (a) nonparticipation or (b) a double-investment
situation of risk capital, as well as non-participation in the
franchisor's separate business.5 0
This test is broader than Hawaii Market Centers, but in agreement
with Silver Hills, on the "profit-expectation" question; additionally, if
risk capital is provided, the franchisee must have a voice in the parent
concern, as well as control over his own operation. Also, the expansion
away from "initial capitalization" is, of course, broader than Silver Hills.
Hurst v. Dare to be Great Inc.,15 1 an Oregon decision subsequent
to Consumer Business System, follows an even more variant avenue of
attack. Involved was a referral-sales plan centered around the sale of a
motivational course, the physical products of which involved tape re-
corders and briefcases. The court did not discuss capitalization at all,
either initial or otherwise. Instead, it relied on testimony that some of
the money was earmarked for paying instructors, researching material,
and purchasing tape recorders and briefcases. The court concluded that
"even though the Defendant had a product in being when it started so-
liciting business,1 52 the risk capital theory of Consumer Business Sys-
tem applied.
The court in SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,5 3 viewed the vari-
ous theories that were travelling under the "risk capital" label and stated
that the term would be used "somewhat advisedly," since "its precise
meaning is unsettled."'5 4 This observation is one of the few statements
that can be used without reservation to summarize the "risk capital"
theory.
IV. "RISK CAPITAL" IN FEDERAL COURT
Because of the basic philosophical differences between the "risk
capital" theory and the Howey theory,'55 the progress of the risk capital
approach in federal courts has understandably been slow. The theory
has received the greatest degree of attention in three major cases: Mr.
150. Id. at 67,201.
151. 3 BLUE SxY L. REP. 71,012 (D. Ore. 1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1973).
152. Hurst v. Dare to Be Great, Inc., 3 BLUYE SKY L. REP. 1 71,012, at 67,165.
153. 365 F. Supp. 588 (N.D. Ga. 1973), appeal docketed, No. 73-2339, 5th Cir., May
4, 1973 [hereinafter referred to as Koscot].
154. Id. at 592 n.2.
155. These differences are treated at length in section V infra.
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Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc.,156 and the Glenn Turner cases,
SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises15 7 and SEC v. Koscot Interplane-
tary, Inc.158
A. Mr. Steak
The "securities" claim in Mr. Steak arose from defendant's counter-
claims to the plaintiff-vendor's suit for money owed. Plaintiff had sold
defendant a franchised restaurant operation and had required defendant
to enter into a "restaurant manager's agreement" with a manager who
had been recruited and trained by plaintiff. Plaintiff was not granted,
and did not assume, the power to direct the daily operations of the
restaurant, but plaintiff did retain certain supervisory powers. While the
contract seemed to afford plaintiff de facto control since the manager was
the only person permitted to actively run the operation, the defendant
was given an active role in retention or termination of the manager. The
court concluded that the Howey test could not be met; however, it went
on to note that the operation could be viewed in another light. The "risk
capital" approach was introduced by pointing to the funding functions
that were accomplished in several cases decided under the Howey
theory:
One salient feature of most cases finding an investment con-
tract has involved the solicitation of funds for speculative,
poorly-financed business ventures . . . . In these instances, the
investor, even if he can participate in or control some phase of
the enterprise, is gambling "risk capital", where there is less
than an even chance of success, against the opportunity for
large profits....
Since no federal court has yet considered the risk capital
approach, we must look to state law for its basic tenets."59
The court then analyzed Silver Hills and the attorney general opin-
ion' 1° on franchises. The court's comments in general were favorable to
the approach but concluded that
the attorney general's pronouncements must be considered too
extreme. We believe the import of Sobieski and the better view
would limit the 1933 Act to situations where exceptionally high
risk, speculative franchises are involved.' 6 '
156. 324 F. Supp. 640 (D. Colo. 1970), modified and aff'd, 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir.
1972).
157. 348 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ore. 1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 94
S. Ct. 117 (1973).
158. 365 F. Supp. 588 (N.D. Ga. 1973), appeal docketed, No. 73-2339, 5th Cir., May
4, 1973.
159. Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640, 646 (D. Colo. 1970),
modified and aff'd, 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972).
160. See section III supra.
161. Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640, 647 (D. Colo. 1970),
modified and aff'd, 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972).
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After analyzing the financial condition of the plaintiff-vendor, the
court found that a "security" had not been sold and dismissed the fed-
eral claims as well as the pendent claim under the Colorado Blue Sky
Act.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed,162 relying basically on the
Howey theory and noted that "Mr. Steak does not retain the right to
direct the daily operations of the restaurant although it does have a right
to see that certain standards are met.""' As for the risk capital theory,
the court briefly stated that "the facts, especially the financial position
of Mr. Steak, do not warrant the application of such a doctrine. 10 4
B. Dare to Be Great and Koscot
1. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.'65-
"RISK CAPITAL THROUGH THE BACK DOOR"
Turner Enterprises involved a referral-sales marketing plan entitled
"Dare to Be Great." The underlying product involved was a series of
motivational and self-improvement courses. In addition to the motiva-
tional materials, purchasers could also obtain contracts through which
they could become "Independent Sales Agents" and earn sales commis-
sions for supplying prospects who eventually made purchases. Tech-
nically, this operation did not involve a "multi-level distributorship" 66
since all sales agents were on the same level. Rather than spawning a
multitude of subordinate sales personnel who were connected to the
many levels of superior personnel through overriding commissions,
"Dare to Be Great" involved only two basic levels, the company and
the agents.
The Commission moved for an injunction and the appointment of
a receiver in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon,
contending that the contracts fell within the statutory terms "investment
contract," "certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement" and "in general, any interest or instrument commonly
known as a security." The court agreed with the Commission on all three
categories. An "investment contract" was found, based on the court's
findings of fact that the agents were not actually involved in the sales
process." 7 In so doing, however, the court formulated three clearly er-
roneous theories. First, the court reasoned that market saturation was
likely and that since the agent would be unable to find prospects upon
saturation, at such time the "efforts of the investor are simply irrelevant,
162. Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972).
163. Id. at 669.
164. Id. at 670-71.
165. 348 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ore. 1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 94
S. Ct. 117 (1973).
166. See section II, B, 4, d supra.
167. See id.
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even if he spends all his time in futile efforts to sell the unsellable.' '16 8
Irrelevant efforts, the court concluded, could not be significant to suc-
cess or failure, and thus the "solely from the efforts of others" test was
met. What the court ignored was that it is not the ultimate effectiveness
of the efforts that is determinative. For example, if A and B become
partners in an oil venture, with A to handle the financial matters and B
to drill the well and produce the oil, what happens if the hole is dry? Is
B to contend that since his efforts were unproductive that they were ir-
relevant and that, therefore, he was offered an opportunity to share in
the profits produced solely from someone else's efforts?
The court's second error was its reliance on State v. Gopher Tire &
Rubber Co.,169 an early Blue Sky case advocated by the Commission.
In Gopher Tire, the defendant sold what amounted to some sort of an
equity interest in his business. Purchasers of "certificates" could share
pro rata in 10% of defendant's profits, but they had to promise to "talk
up" defendant's products. There was no connection between doing work
and making money; there were no controls on the "booster agent." In-
deed, one commentator has noted that these "agents" did nothing more
than what any ordinary stockholder would do.170 Nevertheless, the court
in Turner Enterprises found the plan in Gopher Tire to be "analogous
to that in question here .... ,
Thirdly, the court held that the payment of commissions involved
"profit sharing" regardless of the fact that agents were entitled to pay-
ment for sales consummated even if the company lost money.
The court's most ingenious effort, however, was in sneaking in a
"risk capital" approach through the back door of "commonly known as
a 'security.'" The "commonly known as" term is one that is quite lack-
ing in interpretation, although the Joiner court used it interchangeably
with "investment contract," and stated that "the test . . . is what char-
acter the instrument is given in commerce by the terms of the offer, the
plan of distribution, and the economic inducements held out to the
prospect.' 7 2
The Supreme Court of Utah was probably technically correct when
it construed its state's "commonly known as" term as follows:
General terms cannot be given a literal meaning independent
of the context in which they are used .... [C]onsideration of
the full text of the law in question manifests that it is directed
at securities of the nature that are dealt commercially ....
Securities in the commercial sense usually signifies the invest-
168. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 766, 776 (D. Ore. 1972),
aff'd, 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 117 (1973).
169. 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937 (1920).
170. Note, What is a Security, 25 S. CA,. L. REv. 208 (1952).
171. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 766, 776 (D. Ore. 1972),
aff'd, 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 117 (1973).
172. 320 U.S. 344, 352-53 (1943).
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ment of funds with a view to receiving a profit through the
efforts of others than the investor .... 173
This approach is merely the application of a common rule of statutory
construction.
At any rate, the Turner Enterprises court felt free to construe the
"commonly known as" term as it saw fit. First the court determined that
the instrument or interest must be "commonly known" within the legal
or financial community as a "security." Then the court concluded that
state law could determine "commonly known as" and that the "risk
capital" test was "an appropriate test to look to for determining what is
'commonly known as a security.' ,174
This approach opens the door to serious problems, since, rather than
focusing on the economic relationships involved, it is based upon time.
For example, two purchasers of the same program might sue in federal
court and reach opposite results if the passage of time had resulted in
more state cases holding that such an arrangement was or was not a
"security." Chaos is a possibility. In any event, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed on the "investment contract" theory only, totally ignoring the
"risk capital through the back door" approach.
2. SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.175 -
CAUTIOUS AWARENESS OF SERIOUS PROBLEMS
Koscot involved a referral-sales marketing plan coupled with a
multi-level distributorship system for the sale of cosmetics. Once again
the Commission relied on the statutory catch-alls of "investment con-
tract," "profit-sharing agreement," and "interest or instrument com-
monly known as a security." The crucial findings of fact were that the
agents were indeed involved in the sales process, both by recruiting
prospects and by helping consummate the sales. Their efforts were found
to be "fundamental and substantial .... I" The Koscot court rejected
any effort to employ the "profit-sharing" term:
[T]o construe the term "profit-sharing" to cover the situation
presented here goes . . . beyond broad reading, and becomes
plain judicial over-reach. The term "profit-sharing" has an
ordinary significance which would be ignored if it were read
173. Memorial Gardens v. Love, 5 Utah 2d 270, 273, 300 P.2d 628, 630 (1956). For
other holdings applying the Howey test to the "commonly known as" term, see People
v. Syde, 37 Cal. 2d 765, 235 P.2d 60 (1951); State v. Heath, 199 N.C. 135, 153 S.E. 855
(1930); Commonwealth v. Consumers Research Consultants, Inc., 414 Pa. 253, 199 A.2d
429 (1964); Bruner v. State, 463 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
174. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 766, 774 (D. Ore. 1972),
aff'd, 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 117 (1973).
175. 365 F. Supp. 588 (N.D. Ga. 1973), appeal docketed, No. 73-2339, 5th Cir., May
4, 1973.
176. Id. at 591.
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to treat simple commissions and finder's fees as shares of
profits.
77
The court also rejected an "investment contract" argument. The
Koscot court noted that the Gopher Tire scheme relied on in Turner
Enterprises was
materially different from this case. The program in Gopher Tire
in reality would permit a person to receive a return on the
money he invested with minimal or no effort, because each
person's return was not directly linked to his own effort.
In arguing the "commonly known as" term, the Commission fol-
lowed two avenues of attack. First it contended that several Blue Sky
decisions had held similar types of programs to be "securities." This
contention was rejected. The court found the authorities to be widely
split and concluded that, without a United States Supreme Court hold-
ing that a recognizable national standard existed, chaos and confusion
among the jurisdictions would result. The Commission's second approach
contended that the "risk capital" theory was a proper standard for in-
terpreting "commonly known as." The court first acknowledged that the
term "risk capital" was being used "somewhat advisedly" since several
theories were circulating under that label. Recognizing that the risk
capital approach was an emerging philosophical trend, the court never-
theless noted that an emerging trend was not equivalent to "commonly
known as." The court concluded that, "for now at least," the risk capital
theory could not be used to interpret "commonly known as" so as to ex-
tend coverage to plans that fell outside of Howey's scope.
The most prominent aspect of these decisions is the degree of diffi-
culty encountered in attempting to apply a "risk capital" approach in
federal court. Until there is some final authority on the matter, federal
courts will continue to encounter difficulties, since the theory is philo-
sophically and economically at odds with the federal Howey-type con-
cept.
V. COMMENTS AND COMPARISONS
The differences between Howey and Silver Hills come down to this:
If you believe that an enterprise cannot raise capital without selling "se-
curities," Silver Hills is proper; but if you believe that a "security" is
determined by the "character the instrument is given in commerce by
the terms of the offer, the plan of distribution, and the economic induce-
ments held out to the prospect,'1 709 a Howey-type theory is appropriate,
regardless of the use to which the funds are devoted. "You pays your
money and takes your choice."
177. Id. at 591.
178. Id. at 591 n.1.
179. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 352-53 (1943).
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On a philosophical level, it might be noted that a Silver Hills ap-
proach fits best with a merit regulation jurisdiction. While the federal
acts are devoted solely to full disclosure, regardless of the quality of the
offering, some Blue Sky jurisdictions look to the merits of what is being
offered. The "risk capital" approach requires inquiry into areas such as
capitalization, and it is a short leap from such an inquiry to a determi-
nation that the offering is a "bad deal." Silver Hills itself reveals such
an inquiry: The term "security" is defined "broadly enough to protect
the public against spurious schemes, however ingeniously devised, to at-
tract 'risk capital.' "110 "Its objective is to afford those who risk their
capital at least a fair chance of realizing their objectives in legitimate
ventures .... "I'll
The Supreme Court of Hawaii, in State v. Hawaii Market Centers,
Inc.,8 z defined the purposes of that state's Blue Sky Law as being "(1)
to prevent fraud, and (2) to protect the public against the imposition of
unsubstantial schemes .... ,,3
Perhaps the most flagrant example of this type of reasoning appears
in State v. Glenn Turner Enterprises, Inc.,8 where, after enunciating
its own test for the existence of a "security," the court noted-almost as
an afterthought-that "[o] f course, the factual situation would have to
be one which would fall within the regulatory purpose of the securities
law."' 85 Such a pronouncement opens the door to a system of securities
regulation based on judicial pick-and-choose.
The "full disclosure" system operates through the following sort of
analysis: First, it must be determined whether what is being offered is
a "security"; then, if a "security" is found to exist, the registration sec-
tions of the acts apply, absent some exemption. As Justice Brennan put
it, it is not proper to conclude that "because subjection of the contracts
in question ... to federal regulation is desirable, it has in fact been ac-
complished."'1 6 Under the various theories traveling under the "risk
capital" label, the analysis seems drastically different: The first inquiry
is to whether the offering is beneficial; if not, it is labeled a "security"
and is subjected to the acts.
The district court in SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.187 is the
first to officially recognize this phenomenon. In refusing to apply the
federal "commonly known as" term by reference to a "risk capital"
theory, that court noted that the "risk capital" approach is one that is
180. Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 814, 361 P.2d 906, 907
(1961) (emphasis added).
181. Id. at 815, 361 P.2d at 908 (emphasis added).
182. 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971).
183. Id. at 648, 485 P.2d at 109.
184. 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 1 71,023 (Idaho 4th Dist. 1972).
185. Id. at 67,201.
186. SEC v. Variable Annuity Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 80 (1959) (concurring opinion).
187. 365 F. Supp. 588 (N.D. Ga. 1973), appeal docketed, No. 73-2339, 5th Cir., May
4, 1973.
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traditionally reserved to the states. The recent emphasis in
state security legislations has been on the merits of the offering,
while federal regulations has thus far been limited to the aim
of honest disclosure .... 188
At a time when criticism of Howey is a mark of progressive thought,
one is cast into quite a reactionary posture in defending the theory. But
Howey has certain superior qualities, one of which is certainty. The "se-
curity" or "non-security" question will not be determined by the identity
of the offeror. Since the economic inducements to the purchaser are the
crucial factors, a particular deal will be a security regardless of the fi-
nancial state of the issuer. While other theories are being propounded
in an attempt to encompass any plan that shows some sign of involving
an investment, Howey confines itself to investments in securities.
Furthermore, while the state statutes-as construed-indicate a
legislative intent to regulate a wide range of money-making, investment-
oriented schemes, Congress has created specific acts to regulate specific
investment-oriented areas. In addition to the securities acts, Congress
has passed the mail fraud statutes,""9 the Federal Trade Commission""
and anti-trust provisions 1' and the Interstate Land Sales Act. 2 Thus,
there is no intent to cover all arrangements that involve an investment.
All investments are not necessarily "securities": the term "security" in
the federal acts must be interpreted in light of the legislative intent in
1933 and 1934. Howey and Tcherepnin v. Knight"9 3 provide such an in-
terpretation.
The "risk capital" jurisdictions, especially in the franchise area,
are performing what is basically a legislative function in rewriting defi-
nitions to include new forms of investments that differ dramatically from
investments in "securities."
Certainly, there are instances in which promoters have avoided
stock or bond issuance and have raised capital through the sale of other
interests, such as franchises. And it cannot be doubted that the fran-
chisee makes an investment in the parent level, while he is depending on
his own skills in his own level of the enterprise. But not all investments
are ''securities."
At this writing, the Commission is currently contending in the
Koscot appeal that "the subjection of one's money to the risk of an en-
terprise over which he exercises no managerial control" is an appropriate
188. Id. at 593 (original emphasis). As of this writing one additional court has seen
fit to tailor the definition of "security" in line with the underlying policies of the juris-
diction's regulatory scheme. See State v. Investors Security Corp., - Minn. -, 209 N.W.2d
405 (1973).
189. E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1342 (1970).
190. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1970).
191. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
192. 15 U.S.C. § 1701 (1970).
193. 389 U.S. 332 (1967) (interpreting definitions in Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
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test for applying the "commonly known as" term in the federal acts.
This test is derived from the statements in Hawaii Market Centers
194
and the district court's decision in Turner Enterprises."9 5 Such a test
would subject every franchise operation in the nation, including all of
its gas stations, fast food operations, chain motels, and other familiar
features of contemporary society based upon franchising, to the dis-
closure requirements of the securities acts, since in each of these oper-
ations the franchisee exercises no control over the franchisor's level of
the operation. One federal court has already made note of this pandora's
box. The Southern District of New York in Wieboldt v. Metz'96 analyzed
this test and concluded:
In this regard, we think it is only necessary that the franchisee
exercise policy-making power over his unit of the enterprise,
since to require control over the franchisor's entire system is
incompatible with the franchising method and would make all
franchises investment contracts. 97
In everyday business and commerce, the subjection of one's money
to the risk of an enterprise over which he exercises no managerial con-
trol is a common occurrence. When one orders from the Spiegel or Sears,
Roebuck catalogue, the transferred funds are subject to the risks of the
mail-order company, an enterprise over which the purchaser certainly
exercises no "managerial control." Practically every business operation
is dependent on, and invests its funds in, other entities for raw materials,
parts, or labor. If these other entities do not perform, the dependent op-
eration suffers; but, as the district court in Mr. Steak noted,19 this de-
pendency is oftentimes the ordinary risk incidental to the operation of a
business.
The "risk capital" decisions are pursuing a meritorious goal; they
attempt to reach operations that are avoiding the issuance of equity or
debt interests by selling some other type of interest, usually a franchise.
But the economic inducements held out to prospective franchisees are
quite different from the inducements held out to the purchaser of stocks
or bonds. Unless we are ready to turn control of all investments over to
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the risk capital decisions-
and the consequences of the various tests-ought to be scrutinized quite
closely. The securities acts changed the rule of the market place from
caveat emptor to caveat venditor in one particular area of society. The
recent decisions would extend this change in emphasis to much broader
194. 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971).
195. 348 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ore. 1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 94
S. Ct. 117 (1973).
196. 335 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
197. Id. at 260.
198. 324 F. Supp. 640, 647 (D. Colo. 1970), modified and aff'd, 460 F.2d 666 (10th
Cir. 1972).
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perimeters. While such a change might prove to be immensely beneficial,
it is a change that ought to occur through a carefully delineated legis-
lative scheme, rather than by piecemeal judicial transformation.
The lead of California should be followed in enacting separate fran-
chise legislation199 so that further blurring of the elements of a "security"
will be prevented. Howey, as properly interpreted, serves its purpose.
To discard its test, and to make the securities acts "catch-alls" has
serious drawbacks. While the crooked operations that occasionally arise
might be controlled (although other statutory weapons are available),
unnecessary confusion is created in the business community.
Unless the Supreme Court grants certiorari in one of the SEC ac-
tions against the referral-sales operations 200 and sets out some definitive
guidelines, the current variations in the states will continue to plague
the practitioner and his entrepreneur client. The "risk capital" approach
and the new variations it has spawned, encompassing any arrangement
that shows signs of involving the investment process, engender continued
uncertainty. The current state of the law is reflected fairly accurately in
one recent opinion: "i[]t is enough to call a security a security."120'
While Gertrude Stein might agree, it is hard to see how the due process
clause-or a system or orderly business regulation-can tolerate such
an analysis.
199. CAL. CoRp. CODE 1 31000 (Deering Supp. 1973). The California Blue Sky act
specifically excludes from the definition of "security" "any franchise subject to registration
under the Franchise Investment Law .... " CAL. CoRp. CODE § 25019 (Deering Supp. 1973).
200. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ore. 1972),
af'd, 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 117 (1973); SEC v. Koscot Inter-
planetary, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 588 (N.D. Ga. 1973), appeal docketed, No. 73-2339, 5th
Cir., May 4, 1973.
201. Continental Marketing Assoc., Inc., 3 BLUE SxY L. REP. 71,016, at 67,176 (Ind
Sec. Comm'n 1969).
